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ABSTRACT
Firms reduce investment when facing downward wage rigidity (DWR), the inability
or unwillingness to adjust wages downward. I construct DWR measures and exploit
staggered state-level changes in minimum wage laws as an exogenous variation in
DWR to document this fact. Following a minimum wage increase, firms reduce their
investment rate by 1.17 percentage points. Surprisingly, this labor market friction
enhances firm value and production efficiency when firms are subject to other frictions
causing overinvestment, consistent with the theory of second best. Finally, I identify
increased operating leverage and aggravation of debt overhang as mechanisms by
which DWR impedes investment.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Firms do not appear to fully adjust wages in response to labor market conditions,
particularly when the marginal product of labor decreases. This is referred to as
downward wage rigidity.1 This friction essentially converts a wage claim into a debt-
like contract that requires firms to pay a fixed amount, that is presumably unrelated
to worker productivity or market equilibrium wages. The result is creation of an
additional debt overhang (Myers, 1977) on top of a firm’s actual amount of debt.
Downward wage rigidity also increases a firm’s operating leverage because wages do
not fall by as much as output falls during bad times. The greater operating leverage
can crowd out financial leverage,2 which in turn decreases the firm’s ability to finance
its investment. Hence, downward wage rigidity can deter new investment. Yet em-
pirical evidence of the effect of labor market frictions on investment is elusive, in part
because labor market frictions are difficult to measure and in part because identifying
their effects is challenging.
This study addresses these challenges to investigate the link between downward
wage rigidity and investment. Applying the method proposed in Lebow, Stockton,
1Campbell and Kamlani (1997) provide a review of theories of wage rigidity and investigate
potential sources of wage rigidity using a survey. More recently, Baqaee (2015) proposes a model
in which asymmetric household expectations about the inflation rate generates downward wage
rigidity. Empirical evidence for downward wage rigidity can be found, for example, in Card and
Hyslop (1997), Kahn (1997), Lebow, Saks, and Wilson (2003), Daly, Hobijn, and Lucking (2012),
Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2014), and Kurmann, McEntarfer, and Spletzer (2016).
2See Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) and Serfling (2016).
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and Wascher (1995), I construct a firm-level, time-varying measure of downward wage
rigidity using the Quarterly Workforce Indicators from the U.S. Census Bureau, which
contain a rich set of labor market statistics, including worker flows and earnings. The
idea is to construct a notional (rigidity-free) distribution of wage growth, and to in-
vestigate whether the empirical distribution is compressed from the left relative to
the notional one. The measure exhibits considerable cross-sectional and time-series
variation, and has sensible properties. I show that the measure increases following a
minimum wage increase, affirming its validity.
I first document that my measure is negatively associated with investment. Within
firms, a one standard deviation increase in downward wage rigidity is associated with
a 1.8% decrease in the investment rate (i.e., capital expenditure/capital stock) rela-
tive to the median after controlling for firm and year fixed effects and other firm-level
determinants of investment. These results are robust to using three alternative mea-
sures, and additional tests show that they are unlikely to be driven by labor adjust-
ment with capital-labor complementarity, the business cycle, or inflation. Accounting
for measurement errors in Tobin’s q and my measure using the linear cumulant equa-
tions of Erickson, Jiang, and Whited (2014), I find that the results are robust to
these remedies. I also find that the negative impact is more pronounced for firms
with higher labor intensity or stickier product prices. These results suggest that la-
bor market frictions indeed drive firms’ decisions to reduce investment.
Yet empirical identification is challenging not only because wage policy may be
correlated with the demand for capital, but also because it could be simultaneously
determined with investment decisions. To develop causal inferences, I exploit the
staggered state-level changes in minimum wage laws as a source of exogenous varia-
2
tion in downward wage rigidity. The basic idea is that an increase in the minimum
wage puts a higher floor on wages, which makes wages more downward rigid. The
identification strategy hinges on the assumption that changes in minimum wage laws
are exogenous to individual firm outcomes.
This empirical setting is well suited for testing the causal link between downward
wage rigidity and investment in the following three ways. First, it satisfies the rele-
vance condition.3 I show that my measure indeed increases after the minimum wage
increase, and this effect is more pronounced for firms with a higher fraction of mini-
mum wage workers. Second, a change in state-level minimum wage laws can largely be
regarded as exogenous to individual firm outcomes. This identifying assumption could
be violated if improved investment opportunities in the state prompted the passage
of a law that increases the minimum wage. However, the improved local investment
opportunity should boost investment, which is likely to bias my tests against finding
a negative relation. Third, owing to staggered changes in minimum wage rates, firms
can be in both the treatment and control groups at different times, which alleviates
the potential problem of systematic differences between treatment and control firms.
I find that, after a minimum wage increase, firms reduce their investment rates by
1.17 percentage points, a 6.2% decrease relative to the median investment rate. The
negative effects are more pronounced for firms in industries that are most subject to
3If inflation triggers a minimum wage increase, the relevance condition may be violated. Card and
Hyslop (1997) document that downward rigidity of nominal wages becomes weaker during a high-
inflation period because wage policy is more flexible when inflation is anticipated. Hence, minimum
wage increases will have a negative (not positive) impact on downward wage rigidity. Also, the
identifying assumption may be violated due to the potential impact of inflation on investment.
Therefore I exclude 15 states that have indexed their minimum wage to inflation.
3
the changes in minimum wage laws. These industries are identified by the percentage
of hourly workers with earnings close to the prevailing minimum wage. Moreover, the
negative effects are stronger for firms in states with strong employment protection
laws. These results lend further credence to this identification strategy.
With the negative impact identified, I turn to an examination of the value conse-
quences. Consider a typical optimization problem in which a firm maximizes share-
holder value. Imposing an additional binding friction reduces the firm’s choice sets
and seems to unconditionally lower the value function. The theory of second best
(Viner, 1950; Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) suggests that this may not always be true,
however.4 The newly added friction (e.g., downward wage rigidity) may partially
counteract the effect of the existing frictions on investment (e.g., overinvestment) by
causing the firm to avoid value-destroying projects, thereby improving production
efficiency.
I examine this theoretical prediction by focusing on market value and total factor
productivity (TFP) for firms that are identified by the literature as over- or under-
investing. I find that downward wage rigidity is positively associated with firm value
when firms are likely to overinvest; this circumstance is proxied in the literature by
firms that have overly confident CEOs (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Campbell et al.,
2011) or CEOs who are currently in the later years of their tenure (Pan, Wang, and
Weisbach, 2016). A one standard deviation increase in downward wage rigidity is
4Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) describe one of main principles of the theory as follows: “in a
situation in which there exist many constraints which prevent the fulfilment of the Paretian optimum
conditions, the removal of any one constraint may affect welfare or efficiency either by raising it, by
lowering it, or by leaving it unchanged” (p.12).
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associated with a 3.8 percentage point increase in Tobin’s q for the overly confi-
dent group. Consistent with firm value results, a one standard deviation increase in
downward wage rigidity is followed by a 0.65% increase in TFP over a year. Taken
together, these results suggest that labor market frictions may curb overinvestment
problems that are due to managerial overconfidence or agency problems, consistent
with the theory of second best.
However, for underinvesting firms, as measured by Hennessy (2004), downward
wage rigidity is negatively associated with firm value and production efficiency, which
implies that this additional friction is inefficient. A one standard deviation increase
in downward wage rigidity is related to a 5.7 percentage point decrease in Tobin’s q
and a 1.60% drop in TFP over a year for the firms in the top quintile of debt overhang.
I explore the channels that may link downward wage rigidity to investment. First,
downward wage rigidity converts a wage claim into a debt-like contract that requires
firms to pay a fixed amount of wages, which exacerbates the debt overhang problem.
As indirect evidence, I indeed find that downward wage rigidity increases a firm’s
default risk for a given amount of actual debt. Second, it also increases a firm’s
operating leverage:5 a one standard deviation increase in downward wage rigidity is
associated with a 5% increase in operating leverage, measured by the sensitivity of
changes in earnings to changes in sales. The heightened operating leverage prevents
firms from using financial leverage, which decreases a firm’s ability to finance its in-
vestment. To support this channel, I also investigate the interaction effect of labor
market and financing frictions on investment. Financially constrained firms, identi-
5A similar argument is made by Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) who focus on employment
protection laws that impose restrictions on firing and hiring.
5
fied by the amount of maturing long-term debt in the following year (Almeida et al.,
2012), further decrease their investment rate as downward wage rigidity increases.6
The main contributions of this study are fourfold. First, it adds to a growing body
of literature that analyzes the interactions between labor markets and corporate fi-
nance; the existing literature (e.g., Agrawal and Matsa, 2013; Kim, 2015; Simintzi,
Vig, and Volpin, 2015; Serfling, 2016) focuses primarily on a friction that is associated
with firing decisions and investigates its impact on capital structure. In contrast, this
study focuses on the friction governing incumbent workers’ wages and examines its
effect on investment.
Second, this study builds on the literature that investigates the impact of frictions
on a firm’s real activities. Previous research has documented that financing frictions
can have a large and perhaps causal impact on both capital investment and employ-
ment.7 While the link between labor market frictions and employment has long been
investigated in economics, much less is known about the role of labor market frictions
in determining investment, the subject of this paper.8
Third, this article documents new evidence for the positive role of labor market
6Schoefer (2015) also examines the role of the interaction between wage rigidity and financing
constraints in explaining hiring fluctuations in the U.S. labor market.
7See, e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988); Hennessy and Whited (2007); Almeida and
Campello (2007); Chava and Roberts (2008) for the impact on investment, and Chodorow-Reich
(2013); Giroud and Mueller (2017); Barrot and Nanda (2016); Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2011)
for the effect on employment.
8Fairhurst and Serfling (2016) show that restraints on a firm’s firing decisions have a negative
impact on investment.
6
frictions in the context of corporate investment. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) propose
a theory in which labor market frictions that distort a wage structure encourage firms
to enhance the productivity of low-skilled workers through worker training.9 Simi-
larly, Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014) provide evidence that employment
protection laws against unjust dismissal stimulate (rather than impede) corporate
innovation by mitigating holdup problems. This article complements the existing
literature by pointing out the countervailing effect of labor market frictions on firm
overinvestment, which could improve firm value and production efficiency. These re-
sults call for a richer theory on the interaction between labor and other frictions in
the firm on its investment.
Finally, this article has policy implications for minimum wage laws, which are a
source of political contention, especially during recent presidential election years10
with the fight for $15-dollar movement in large US cities. Legislators focus mainly on
the potential impact of the minimum wage on income inequality and unemployment
of low-skilled workers. My findings point out an overlooked but important aspect
of minimum wage effects on employment through forgone corporate investment: the
investment cuts may shift the labor demand curve to the left, which further reduces
9See Acemoglu (2002, 2003) for a generalization of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) to a broader
concept of firms’ incentives to raise productivity in the presence of wage compression.
10CNBC News reported on 18 Nov. 2015, for example, “One of the clearest distinctions to come
out of the presidential debates so far has been around the minimum wage ... Democratic candidates’
support for, and the Republican candidates’ opposition to, raising the federal minimum wage.”
7
employment over and above the decline due to the increased wages (Figure 3).11
Hence, regulators should be aware of the consequences of minimum wage policies on
investment.
11“New Jersey Governor Chris Christie vetoed a bill backed by Democratic lawmakers that would
have increased the state’s minimum hourly wage to $15 by 2012. ... The proposed increase, he said,
‘would trigger an escalation of wages that will make doing business in New Jersey unaffordable.’”
(N.J.’s Christie Vetoes Minimum-Wage Bill, Wall Street Journal, 30 Aug. 2016)
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Chapter 2
MEASURING DOWNWARD WAGE RIGIDITY
Studies that examine the extent of downward wage rigidity use several types of
data: payroll records from a small number of selected firms, panel survey data of
households (e.g., the Panel Study of Income Dynamics), and microdata (e.g., the
National Compensation Survey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] or the Longi-
tudinal Employer Household Dynamics [LEHD] from the U.S. Census Bureau). Using
data from a small number of firms is not appropriate for the purposes of this paper
which provides evidence from a large sample on the relation between labor market
frictions and investment. Moreover, payroll records are, in most cases, proprietary
data. The panel survey data may alleviate concerns regarding limited representa-
tiveness, and they are usually publicly available. However, survey data are prone to
measurement errors caused by rounding and faulty recollections.1 Most important,
they do not have enough observations to construct firm-level measures.
Micro-level data are nearly free from all the aforementioned shortcomings but
are not readily accessible because confidentiality issues. Fortunately, the Quarterly
Workforce Indicators (QWI) from the U.S. Census Bureau are available online for
public use; these are based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s LEHD program, which links
works to their employers. The data contain a great deal of information on the U.S.
1For a discussion of the potential impact of measurement errors on wage rigidity measures,
see Akerlof et al. (1996), Gottschalk (2005), and Lunnemann and Wintr (2010), which find that
measurement errors will bias the measures toward zero. Indeed, I find a stronger effect of downward
wage rigidity on investment after accounting for measurement errors (See Table A3).
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labor market, even though only aggregated microdata are publicly available. In the
next section I describe the QWI in more detail. Using the aggregated microdata and
the method described in Section 2.0.2, I construct firm-level downward wage rigidity
measures.
2.0.1 Data
The QWI provide a rich set of local labor market statistics at the aggregate
level by 4-digit NAICS industry, employee demographics (age, gender, education, and
race/ethnicity), employer age and size, and geography (state and county). The data
utilize a wide range of sources, including the administrative records on employment,
Social Security data, federal tax records, and other census and survey data: Unem-
ployment Insurance Earnings Data (UI), Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW), Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS), and demographic data sources.2 The
main variables I use to construct the firm-level measures of downward wage rigidity
are worker flows and average quarterly earnings of full-quarter employment.3
The source of the QWI is unique job-level data (not firm- or person-level data)
from the LEHD program. Moreover, the LEHD data cover over 95% of U.S. private
sector jobs. The data are collected through a unique federal-state data sharing col-
laboration, the Local Employment Dynamics (LED) partnership. The partner states
2Details on each data source can be found at http://lehd.ces.census.gov/data/.
3Pissarides (2009) points out that wages for new workers are more procyclical than those for
incumbents. Therefore, I focus on downward wage rigidity of job stayers. For more empirical
evidence that wage rigidity is more severe for incumbent workers, see Table II and III in Pissarides
(2009), and references therein.
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submit quarterly data from existing administrative record systems, which are less
subject to measurement errors caused by self-reporting than other survey-based data.
Total wages reported by the Unemployment Insurance Earnings Data include
gross wages and salaries, bonuses, stock options, tips and other gratuities, and the
value of meals and lodging, where supplied. Hence, the earnings data from the QWI
essentially capture the total labor costs to firms. The QWI are produced quarterly,
and the earliest time series begin in 1990. Because the availability of QWI data is
limited before 1994, my sample period begins in 1994. The National QWI are also
available from 1993.4
2.0.2 Definitions
The literature proposes various methods for quantifying the extent of down-
ward wage rigidity. These methods share one basic idea: first, construct a notional
(rigidity-free and menu-costs-free)5 distribution of wage growth, and then examine
whether the empirical wage growth distribution is compressed from the left relative
to the notional distribution.
The measure developed by Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher (1995) assumes a sym-
metric notional distribution and estimates the difference between the cumulative fre-
quencies of empirical distribution above twice the median and below zero wage growth.
Because this measure is a pure order statistic, it is less subject to extreme outliers.
Using this method and microdata underlying the Employment Cost Index by the
4Since I use the wage growth rate year-over-year to construct the downward wage rigidity mea-
sures, my sample starts from 1994.
5A menu cost is a fixed cost that firms must pay to change wages.
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BLS, Lebow, Saks, and Wilson (2003) find evidence of downward wage rigidity in the
U.S. labor market. Kahn (1997) proposes another method, which does not rely on a
symmetry assumption but uses seemingly unrelated regressions with cross-equation
constraints, and also finds evidence of this friction. More recently, Kurmann, McEn-
tarfer, and Spletzer (2016) use the confidential data from the LEHD to investigate
the extent and consequences of downward wage rigidity in the U.S. They use three
asymmetry statistics—missing mass left-of-zero wage growth rate, spike at zero, and
excess mass right-of-zero—that are similar to those used in Card and Hyslop (1997).
Using the approach of Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher (1995) as a baseline method, I
construct a firm-level measure.6 I also check the robustness of the main results with
alternative measures used in Kurmann, McEntarfer, and Spletzer (2016). Detailed
definitions of these alternative measures are reported in Section B.
The first step is to calculate nominal wage growth rates year-over-year using quar-
terly earnings. Many studies use hourly pay rates to examine the extent of down-
ward wage rigidity. However, Kurmann, McEntarfer, and Spletzer (2016) document
that firms reduce the labor costs of incumbent workers by reducing the number of
hours worked (the intensive margin) rather than by lowering hourly wages. Therefore
changes in quarterly earnings provide a more accurate measure of the flexibility of
total labor costs. In this regard, hourly wages matter little in corporate investment
6My measures may be subject to potential asymmetry of the underlying notional distribution.
However, since I exploit within-firm variation in these measures when estimating the effect of down-
ward wage rigidity on investment, the potential asymmetry would have little impact on the estima-
tion provided that it is stable over time. This idea is consistent with that of Kurmann, McEntarfer,
and Spletzer (2016) who argue that an asymmetry measure itself does not necessarily indicate down-
ward wage rigidity, but that the difference in this measure across otherwise similar firms is a more
valid measure.
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decisions. On top of adjusting the intensive margin, firms may reduce the number of
workers (the extensive margin) when they face higher unit labor costs. Therefore I
control for hiring and separation rates in the main analysis (Section 4.0.4).
As pointed out by the U.S. Census Bureau, all items, including average quar-
terly earnings for full-quarter employment, may contain an elevated level of noise for
confidentiality protection. Hence, I treat average quarterly earnings at quarter t as
a missing observation if it lies outside the interval between 50% and 500% of the
time-series mean of average quarterly earnings. That is, I remove earnings data that
decrease by half or increase fivefold over one quarter.7
It should be noted that the observational unit is a change in the quarterly earnings
in a group. Hence, the measure based on the aggregated microdata will be affected by
the compositional effect as a result of wage differences between newly hired workers
and departing workers. The direction of this effect on estimates of downward wage
rigidity is unclear a priori. However, as empirically shown in Lebow, Saks, and Wil-
son (2003), the estimates using job-level (aggregated) data are lower than those using
individual-level data (see also Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk, 2014). Therefore, it
is more likely that using aggregated earnings data biases the measures toward zero,
which leads to an underestimation of the true effects.
Next, for each firm-size (5 groups) and year-quarter pair, I calculate the firm-size-
level downward wage rigidity using a rich set of cross-sectional data on wage growth
7Using different criteria for removing outliers yields almost the same results.
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at state × NAICS 4 digit × employee gender × employee age level:8:
DWRfs,t =
∫ ∞
2·medfs,t
ffs,t(x)dx−
∫ 0
−∞
ffs,t(x)dx (2.1)
where ffs,t and medfs,t refer to an empirical probability density function of log wage
growth and a median of the same distribution for a given firm size group (fs) at year-
quarter (t), respectively. The measure essentially compares the cumulative frequency
of wage growth above twice the median with that below zero wage growth. Hence
it measures missing mass left-of-zero wage growth (see Figure 1). Since the observa-
tional unit is a group of employees, I calculate number-of-employees weighted medians.
Similarly, for each industry and year-quarter pair, I calculate the NAICS 4-digit-
level measure using cross-sectional data on wage growth at state × firm size × em-
ployee gender × employee age level:9:
DWRind,t =
∫ ∞
2·medind,t
find,t(x)dx−
∫ 0
−∞
find,t(x)dx (2.2)
where find,t and medind,t refer to an empirical probability density function of log wage
growth and a median of the same distribution for a given industry (ind) at year-
quarter (t).
Last, using cross-sectional data on wage growth at the NAICS 4-digit × firm
8Note that the maximum possible number of observations in this cross-sectional distribution is
51 (states) × 313 (NAICS 4-digit industries) × 2 (employee genders) × 8 (employee age groups) =
255,408 for a given firm size and year-quarter.
9Note that the maximum possible number of observations in this cross-sectional distribution is
51 (states) × 5 (firm sizes) × 2 (employee genders) × 8 (employee age groups) = 4,080 for a given
industry and year-quarter.
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size × employee gender × employee age level,10 I construct the following state-level
measure for each year-quarter:
DWRst,t =
∫ ∞
2·medst,t
fst,t(x)dx−
∫ 0
−∞
fst,t(x)dx (2.3)
where fst,t and medst,t refer to an empirical probability density function of log wage
growth and a median of the same distribution for a given state (st) at year-quarter (t).
Then I define the firm-level measure as an average of these three-dimensional (firm
size, industry, headquarters state) measures as follows:11
DWRi,t =
1
3
[
DWRfs=fsi,t +
∑
indj
Salesi,indj ,t ·DWRind=indj ,t∑
indj
Salesi,indj ,t
+DWRst=sti,t
]
(2.4)
where fsi indicates firm i’s firm size group as of t, indj denotes each industry segment
of firm i, Salesi,indj ,t is the sales amount of industry segment j in firm i at t, and
sti refers to the state where firm i’s headquarters is located. Information about
firms’ headquarters in the Compustat database reflects only the most recent location,
not previous locations. However, as pointed out in the literature, locations rarely
change, and even when they do, the new and old locations are usually not far apart.12
10Note that the maximum possible number of observations in this cross-sectional distribution at
quarter t is 313 (NAICS 4-digit industries) × 5 (firm sizes) × 2 (employee genders) × 8 (employee
age groups) = 25,040 for a given state and year-quarter.
11Note that the information about the number of employees by industry segment and sales by
geographic segment is also available in the Compustat Segment files. However, many firm-year
observations have missing values in these variables. Moreover, the method used by a firm to organize
its geographic segments is inconsistent and varies across firms: e.g., some firms report state-level
geographic segments whereas other firms use regional geographic segments. As a robustness check,
I construct a sub-sample of single-segment firms, and find qualitatively similar results.
12I confirm this in my sample using historical headquarters data from Bill McDonald’s website
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/10-K_Headers/10-K_Headers.html.
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Moreover, this measurement error will bias estimates of the downward wage rigidity
effect on investment toward zero, which leads to an underestimation of the true effect.
If a firm operates in more than one industry, I use the value-weighted average of
industry-level measures across the business segments in which the firm operates. I
use sales from the Compustat Segment files as weights.
2.0.3 Descriptive Statistics and Validity Tests
Panel A of Table 1 gives summary statistics for firm-level measures of down-
ward wage rigidity. The sample mean of DWR measure is 1.09%, which implies
that, on average, empirical wage growth distribution is compressed from the left by
1.09% relative to the notional distribution. In the absence of downward wage rigidity
(DWR = 0%), the expected aggregate wage change conditional on negative wage
growth amounts to $6.13 billion as of 2013. This amount decreases by $0.72 billion
owing to the average level of friction (DWR = 1.09%), which corresponds to 11.70%
relative to $6.13 billion.13 Alternatively, 11.70% of all jobs that should have expe-
13
[
N ×
∫ 0
−∞
f(x;µ, σ)dx
]
× w ×
(
exp
[ ∫ 0
−∞
xf(x;µ, σ|x < 0)dx
]
− 1
)
= −$6.13 billion
$6.13 billion× DWR∫ 0
−∞ f(x;µ, σ)dx
= $0.72 billion
where N refers to the total number of jobs, w is average annual earnings per job, f(x;µ, σ) represents
a probability density function of normal distribution with mean of µ and standard deviation of σ
where x is log wage growth, and DWR refers to the sample mean of DWR measure. For simplicity,
I assume that a notional distribution of log wage growth is normally distributed, and downward
wage rigidity compresses the empirical distribution proportionally. I calculate the sample moments
(µ = 3.41%, σ = 2.59%) of notional distribution using the National Quarterly Workforce Indicators
(NQWI) from 1994 to 2014. According to the NQWI, the total number of jobs is 100,075,410 and
average annual earnings per job is $53,832 as of 2013.
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rienced wage decreases in the absence of downward wage rigidity will not face wage
reductions under the average level of downward wage rigidity.
Note that various factors lead to variation in downward wage rigidity across firms
and over time. Changes in provisions of the major labor laws play a critical role.
For example, as shown in this paper, wages become more downwardly rigid after an
increase in state-level minimum wage rates. A number of non-legislative factors also
lead to changes in firm-level downward wage rigidity. A firm’s unionization rates or
capacity to pay wages, which varies over time within a firm, affects the degree of
downward wage rigidity. Consistent with this notion, downward wage rigidity mea-
sures vary considerably: for example, the mean of DWR is 1.09% and the standard
deviation is 1.64% (Panel A of Table 1). This sizable cross-sectional and time-series
variation in my measure of downward wage rigidity allows for a powerful test.
In Panel B, I sort NAICS sectors (based on two-digit NAICS codes) by DWR using
a time-series average rank for each sector from 1994 to 2014. Finance and Insurance,
Information, and Manufacturing sectors are the top three sectors among 19 sectors.
I also rank the 19 sectors based on the industry unionization rates, which come from
the Union Membership and Coverage Database by Hirsch and Macpherson (2003).14
They define industry unionization rates as the percentage of an industry’s workers
covered by unions in their collective bargaining with the firm. I use the industry
unionization rates as of 2013 to sort NAICS sectors.
I also conduct a validity test of my measure using changes in state minimum wage
laws across the United States. (See Section 3.1.2 for institutional and estimation
14The data are publicly available at www.unionstats.com.
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details.) If the measure is valid, it should grow when firms’ wage floor rises, and
this effect should be more pronounced for firms with a higher percentage of minimum
wage workers. I use minimum wage worker characteristics data from the Labor Force
Statistics in the Current Population Survey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Indus-
tries that are most (least) subject to minimum wage rates are defined as those with
above- (below-) median percentage of hourly workers with earnings at or below the
prevailing federal minimum wage rates as of 2015. Panel C of Table 2 lists industries
that are most prone to minimum wage increases.
The results in Panel C of Table 1 prove the validity of my measure. In Column
(1), which uses the full sample, changes in downward wage rigidity are positively
associated with minimum wage increases; however, the relation is not statistically
significant. This is partly because a minimum wage increase is one of many factors
that affect a firm’s downward wage rigidity, and partly because my measure contains
measurement errors. If firms belong to industries that are most subject to minimum
wage increases, a greater portion of changes in my measure will be explained by those
increases. Columns (2) and (3) confirm this prediction. The coefficient almost triples
(0.2596) for firms that are most subject to minimum wage, and it is significantly
different from 0 at the 1% level of significance.
Last, Panel D of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for firm-year observations
by low and high downward wage rigidity groups based on the median DWR for each
year. Column (3) shows mean differences in variables between these two groups.
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Chapter 3
DOWNWARD WAGE RIGIDITY AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT
3.1 Sample Construction
I consider a sample of firms listed by Compustat at any point between 1994 and
2014. Following a similar sample selection approach used in Almeida, Campello, and
Galvao (2010), I eliminate observations from financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-
6999). In addition, I discard firm-years that display asset or sales growth exceeding
100% to eliminates firms that exhibit large jumps in business fundamentals in terms of
size and sales because these jumps are usually associated with major corporate events,
such as mergers and acquisitions and/or reorganizations. I also remove very small
firms for which capital is less than $10 million because linear investment models may
not be appropriate for those firms, as discussed in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
Finally, I eliminate firm-years that have negative Tobin’s q. All dollar valued variables
are converted into December 2014 constant dollars using the consumer price index
for all urban consumers (CPI-U).
3.1.1 Downward Wage Rigidity Measures and Corporate Investment
As argued by Tobin (1969) and formally derived by Hayashi (1982), corporate
investment is solely determined by marginal q when there is no friction. Once one al-
lows for financing frictions, a firm’s cash flow also becomes an important determinant
of investment decisions. A standard investment regression used in Fazzari, Hubbard,
and Petersen (1988) provides the empirical framework for researchers to investigate
the effect of financing frictions on investment. It regresses firm-level investment on
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Tobin’s q and cash flow in which Tobin’s q proxies for unobservable true investment
opportunities. Even though the interpretation of cash flow coefficient in this regres-
sion is controversial,1 there seems to be a consensus that financial frictions causally
affect investment, and that these effects are non-trivial (e.g., Hennessy and Whited,
2007; Chava and Roberts, 2008).
If one further takes labor market frictions into account, a natural extension of
the standard investment regression would be to include a measure of labor market
friction. I begin by estimating the effect of downward wage rigidity on investment
using the following specification:
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
= αi + αt + β1Qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
+ β3DWRi,t + i,t (3.1)
where Ii,t is investment, CFi,t refers to cash flow, Ki,t−1 is beginning-of-the-year cap-
ital, Qi,t−1 indicates Tobin’s q as a proxy for investment opportunities, DWRi,t is
the measure of downward wage rigidity defined in Section 2, αt is a set of year fixed
effects, which absorb time-varying macroeconomic shocks faced by all firms, and αi
is a set of firm fixed effects, which absorb time-invariant unobservable firm character-
istics. I cluster standard errors by firm to allow for correlation of the residuals over
time within a firm. I predict β3 to be negative.
Panel A of Table 2 displays baseline results that use the DWR measure. In all
specifications, I find a negative association between investment and downward wage
rigidity, which is significantly different from 0 at the 1% level of significance. Since
I only exploit a time variation in my measure within a firm, the interpretation is
1See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (2000), and Alti (2003) among others.
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that firms invest less when they exhibit a high level of downward wage rigidity. With
the full set of controls, a one standard deviation (1.72%) increase in my measure of
downward wage rigidity implies a 0.34 (0.0172 × 0.1958) percentage point decrease in
the investment rate (i.e., capital expenditure/capital stock). Changing the measure
of downward wage rigidity from the 10th percentile (0.13%) of the distribution to
the 90th percentile (3.37%) would decrease the investment rate by 0.63 percentage
points, which is sizable compared to the median investment rate of 19.21%.2 In Table
A1, I also confirm a strong negative association between downward wage rigidity and
investment using alternative measures.
3.1.2 Minimum Wage Laws across the U.S. States and Corporate Investment:
Exogenous Variation in Downward Wage Rigidity
Empirical identification of the effect of downward wage rigidity on investment
is challenging not only because wage policy may be correlated with demand for capital,
but also because it would be determined simultaneously with investment decisions. To
overcome these challenges and establish a causal effect, I exploit staggered state-level
changes in minimum wage rates as a source of exogenous variation in downward wage
rigidity. The basic idea is that an increase in the minimum wage puts a higher floor on
wages, which makes wages more downward rigid. The identification strategy hinges
on the assumption that changes in minimum wage laws are exogenous to individual
firm outcomes. This section describes (i) institutional details on minimum wage laws
in the U.S., (ii) identification strategy, (iii) estimation procedures and results, and
(iv) a placebo test.
2Note that the negative effect is more pronounced for firms with large assets (not reported).
Therefore, the effect is not simply driven by a number of small firms, and the aggregate economic
impact of downward wage rigidity is even greater.
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Institutional Details
The federal minimum wage provisions for employees in the U.S. are contained
in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the federal legislation that establishes the
general minimum wage rates that must be paid to all covered workers. The FLSA
also establishes overtime pay, recordkeeping, and youth employment standards for
workers in the private sector as well as in federal, state, and local governments. It
was enacted in 1938 and has been amended many times since then. More than 130
million workers in more than 7 million workplaces are protected by the FLSA, which
is enforced by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor.
Many states also have their own minimum wage laws, and their minimum wage
rates may be different from those set by the federal statutes. Some states specifically
set wage rates above the federal rate, while other states index the minimum wage to
inflation or increase the rate in legislatively scheduled increments. Under Section 18
of the FLSA, when an employee is subject to both the federal and state minimum
wage laws, the employee is entitled to the higher of the two standards. The federal
and state minimum wage rates change at various times and in various increments (see
Figure 2).
Identification Strategy
Testing for a causal effect of downward wage rigidity on investment is challenged
by identification concerns regarding endogeneity. Downward wage rigidity, which is
determined by a firm’s wage policy, may be correlated with the firm’s demand for
capital; it may also be determined at the same time as investment decisions. To alle-
viate these concerns, I exploit staggered state-level changes in the minimum wage for
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non-farm private sector employment as a source of exogenous variation in downward
wage rigidity. The basic idea here is that an increase in the minimum wage puts a
higher floor on wages, which makes wages more downward rigid. Therefore investment
decreases after an increase in the minimum wage rates. The identifying assumption
is that changes in state-level minimum wage laws are exogenous to individual firm
outcomes.
This empirical setting is well suited for testing a causal link between downward
wage rigidity and investment in the following three distinct ways. First, a change in
state-level minimum wage laws satisfies the relevance condition for a valid instrument.
As outlined in Section 3.1.2, each state uses its own adjustment mechanism for mini-
mum wage rates: legislatively scheduled increases, indexing to inflation, reference to
the federal rates, or a mix of these three methods. If inflation triggers minimum wage
increases, the relevance condition may be violated. Downward wage rigidity becomes
weaker during a period of high inflation (Card and Hyslop, 1997); therefore minimum
wage increases will have a negative (not positive) impact on downward wage rigidity.
Therefore I exclude 15 states that have indexed their minimum wage rates to some
measure of inflation.3 Indexation is not the only mechanism for wage rate adjustment
that these 15 states have used, but I conservatively rule out all firms headquartered in
these states.4 In Section 3.1.2, I also test whether my measure indeed grows following
the state minimum wage increase.
Second, a change in state-level minimum wage laws can largely be regarded as
3Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Vermont.
4I obtain qualitatively similar results when including those 15 states in my analysis, but the
statistical significance becomes weaker. This is indirect evidence of the validity of my instrument.
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exogenous to individual firm outcomes, which satisfies the exclusion condition. Con-
sider the first case in which a state specifies future rates in legislation. The identifying
assumption may be violated if unobservable improvement of investment opportunity
in the state facilitates the passage of a law that increases the minimum wage. How-
ever, the improved local investment opportunity should boost investment, which is
likely to bias my tests against finding a negative relation between minimum wage
increases and capital expenditure. For the second case, in which a state maintains
the real value of the minimum wage over time by indexing it to inflation, the identi-
fying assumption may be violated by the potential impact of inflation on investment.
However, I already exclude those 15 states because they violate the relevance condi-
tion. Last, for the case in which a state sets its minimum wage based on the federal
rate, whether the identifying assumption is violated depends on how the federal rate
is set. Since the Congress either specifies a single rate in the enacting legislation or
sets rates in advance, the argument for the first case may apply to this case as well.
Third, because minimum wage increases are staggered, it is possible for firms to
be in both the treatment and the control group at different times, which alleviates
the potential problem of systematic differences between treatment and control firms.
In sum, a change in minimum wage laws across the U.S. states is a valid instrument
for examining whether downward wage rigidity has a causal effect on investment.
Figure 2 depicts the time-series of minimum hourly wage rates for California,
Connecticut, and Illinois as an illustrative example. The timing of minimum wage
changes varies across states, and the increments also differ across states and within a
state. The figure shows that changes in states’ minimum wage laws do not necessarily
happen at the same time.
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Estimation
I estimate the following first difference investment regression:
∆
Ii,s,t
Ki,s,t−1
= αt + β1∆Qi,s,t−1 + β2∆
CFi,s,t
Ki,s,t−1
+ β31∆ws,t−1>0 + β4∆Xs,t−1 + ∆i,s,t
(3.2)
where 1∆ws,t−1>0 is a dummy variable indicating minimum wage increases at time t
=1 in state s where firm i’s headquarters is located. I use the same set of firm control
variables, Tobin’s q and cash flow, as in the baseline specification and include year
fixed effects. I also control for state-level variables, Xs,t−1, including real GDP growth
rates, log of population, and unemployment rates. Section D provides definitions and
sources of each state-level variable.
I cluster standard errors at the state-level instead of the firm-level.5 Given that
the minimum wage laws vary by state, potential time-series correlations in unobserved
factors that affect different firms in the same state may lead to inconsistent estimates
of standard errors. Hence, this method accounts for cross-firm correlations of error
terms within a state, which is more general than firm-level clustering. I predict β3 to
be negative.
Column (1) in Panel B of Table 2 reports the estimates for the coefficients in
Equation (3.2). When a state’s minimum wage increases, firms headquartered in that
state reduce their investment rates. The magnitudes of the regression coefficients
indicate that the effect is economically large. Following a minimum wage increase,
5Clustering standard errors by firm yields smaller standard errors.
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firms reduce their investment rates by 117 basis points, which corresponds to a 6.2%
decrease relative to the median investment rate.
An alternative explanation is that a potential decrease in employment due to min-
imum wage increases drives a reduction in capital expenditures through capital-labor
complementarities, not through downward wage rigidity. However, according to the
survey results by the Initiative on Global Markets, there seems to be no consensus
among economic experts regarding whether minimum wage increases have a negative
effect on the employment rate: 26% of the experts believe it does, 38% are uncertain,
and 24% disagree (see also Card and Krueger, 1994, 1995; Dube, Lester, and Reich,
2010; Neumark and Wascher, 2000; Neumark, Salas, and Wascher, 2014; Meer and
West, 2016). Nonetheless, I include changes in hiring and separation rates (or net
hiring rates) in the first difference regression, and confirm that neither the statistical
nor the economic significance of β3 changes.
To lend further credence to this identification strategy, I separately estimate Equa-
tion (3.2) for firms that are least and most subject to the minimum wage changes. I
expect upward pressure on downward wage rigidity due to minimum wage increases to
be more pronounced for firms with a higher fraction of workers with earnings close to
the prevailing minimum wage. Food services and drinking places and Accommodation
are the industries that have the highest fractions (Panel C of Table 2).6
The estimates in Columns (2) and (3) of Panel B in Table 2 support this pre-
6In fact, a report from Moody’s Investors Service points out that minimum wage increases could
erode profit margins in the U.S. restaurant industry. Wall Street Journal, “Minimum Wage Increases
Likely to Hit Restaurant Profits, Moody’s Says,” June 11, 2015
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diction. The negative effects are more (less) pronounced for firms in the industries
that are most (least) subject to the changes in minimum wage laws. The difference
between two coefficients, 1.15 percentage points, across regressions is statistically and
economically significant.7
In addition to the cross-industry tests, I estimate Equation (3.2) across states
with high and low level of employment protection legislation. The idea is that firms
with higher firing costs due to employment protection laws are less likely to adjust
their workforce when they face downward wage rigidity. Therefore, the negative ef-
fect of downward wage rigidity on investment would be more acute for firms that are
headquartered in states with a high level of employment protection. I construct the
Wrongful Discharge Law Score variable by counting the number of exceptions each
state recognizes as of 1994 among the three common law exceptions to the traditional
employment at-will rule: good faith, implied contract, and public policy exceptions.
I use data from Serfling (2016), and the score variable ranges from 0 to 3. I define
states with a high (low) level of employment protection as those with a score of 2 or
3 (0 or 1).
Columns (4) and (5) of Panel B in Table 2 present the estimation results. The
negative effects are stronger (weaker) for firms in states with a high level of em-
ployment protection. The difference between those two coefficients, 1.27 percentage
points, across regressions is statistically and economically significant. Overall, these
7Consistent with the results in Panel A of Table 3, the negative effect in Column (3) of Panel B,
Table 2, is stronger for firms with higher labor intensity than for firms with lower labor intensity,
which indicates that labor market frictions drive my results. For brevity, these results are not
reported here.
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two cross-sectional findings provide support for the notion that the lower investment
is driven by the minimum wage increases.
To complete this analysis, it is essential to show that my measure indeed grows
after the minimum wage increases. This is because minimum wage increases may
affect investment decisions without affecting downward wage rigidity. Using the same
dummy variable in Equation (3.2), I estimate the following first difference regression
of changes in the downward wage rigidity measure:
∆DWRi,s,t = αt + β11∆ws,t−1>0 + ∆i,s,t (3.3)
Panel C of Table 1 displays the results of Equation (3.3). The measure grows
after an increase in the minimum wage, and this relation is stronger for firms in the
industries that are most subject to minimum wage increases.8
Placebo Test
In this section I perform a placebo test to check whether a false minimum wage
increase affects investment. Specifically, I repeat the estimation of Equation (3.2)
using pseudo changes in minimum wage laws. To construct pseudo minimum wage
changes, I randomly assign a firm’s headquarters by maintaining a cross-sectional
distribution of firm headquarters as well as a panel structure of state minimum wage
laws. I repeat this exercise 1,000 times and save the coefficients on 1∆ws,t−1>0 to gauge
the likelihood of obtaining a significant coefficient absent true shocks to a firm’s down-
ward wage rigidity.
8As discussed in Section 2.0.3, Equation (3.3) also checks the validity of my measure. Including
state-level variables (real GDP growth rates, log of population, and unemployment rates) in the
equation does not alter the results.
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Panel D of Table 2 reports the empirical distribution of the coefficients on 1∆ws,t−1>0
based on the random sample. The mean and median of the distribution are close to
zero. Moreover, the estimate in Column (1) of Panel A (=0.0117) falls below the 1%
threshold (see Figure A1). This level of statistical significance is similar to that in
the true estimation shown in Panel A. Therefore the negative effect of a minimum
wage increase on investment is not obtained by random chance.
3.1.3 Do Labor Market Frictions Drive Investment Cuts?
The baseline results in this paper show a significant decline in investment rates
in the presence of downward wage rigidity. In this section, I conduct two conditional
analyses to confirm that labor market frictions drive the investment cuts.
Conditional Analysis by Labor Intensity
I first examine whether the magnitudes of the negative effect of downward wage
rigidity on investment are different in the least and the most labor-intensive firms.
I define labor intensity as a ratio of labor costs to sales, as in Gorodnichenko and
Weber (2016).9
Panel A of Table 3 reports these findings. Column (1) is based on the least
labor-intensive firms, and Column (2) uses the most labor-intensive firms. Downward
wage rigidity is negatively associated with investment for the least labor-intensive
firms, but the relation is statistically insignificant. However, the most labor-intensive
firms exhibit a significant negative relation between the labor market friction and
investment. The magnitude of this negative relation (=0.3235) almost doubles from
9Defining labor intensity as a ratio of the total number of employees to sales (DeWenter and
Malatesta, 2001) yields qualitatively similar results.
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the baseline result (=0.1693) in Column (2) of Panel A in Table 2. For the most
labor-intensive firms, a one standard deviation increase (1.70%) in downward wage
rigidity leads to a 0.55 (0.0170 × 0.3235) percentage point decrease in the investment
rate. Formal statistical tests that compare coefficients between the least and most
labor-intensive firms indicate that the negative effect is statistically stronger for firms
that rely heavily on labor input. These findings ensure that the investment cut is
indeed driven by labor market frictions.
Conditional Analysis by Product Price Stickiness
In addition, the negative effect of downward wage rigidity should be more acute
for inflexible-price firms than for flexible-price firms. The idea is that flexible-price
firms are able to share a greater portion of the burden of labor costs with customers
through cost pass-through: raising the price of products to compensate for higher
input costs.
In Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B of Table 3, I find that the negative effect is
stronger for firms with stickier prices than for firms with more flexible prices. I use
the inverse of the volatility of PPI (producer price index) growth as a measure of
price stickiness at the industry level.10 To construct this measure, I use monthly PPI
data by NAICS 5-digit industries from the BLS.
I also use the frequency of price adjustment (FPA) as an alternative measure
of price stickiness. Using method similar to that used by Gorodnichenko and Weber
(2016), I define industry-level FPA as the fraction of months with PPI changes during
10This measure is motivated by Favilukis and Lin (2016), who use the inverse of the volatility of
wage growth as a proxy for wage rigidity.
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the sample period. PPI changes are defined as observations with PPI growth greater
than 0.5% or less than =0.5%.11 I find similar results in Columns (3) and (4). Overall,
these conditional analyses provide evidence that labor market friction is a key driver
of investment cuts.
11Defining PPI changes as observations with non-zero monthly PPI growth yields qualitatively
similar results.
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Chapter 4
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND ROBUSTNESS
In this section, I investigate the validity of alternative explanations and the
robustness of the main results to measurement errors.
4.0.4 Does Labor Adjustment with Capital-Labor Complementarities Drive These
Findings?
One potential alternative explanation for a firm’s decision to reduce capital
expenditures is the need to adjust capital in response to labor adjustments since a firm
manages cash flow shortfalls by dismissing current employees (Ofek, 1993; John, Lang,
and Netter, 1992; Kang and Shivdasani, 1997). In such cases, downward wage rigidity
would have little direct impact on investment decisions, and a firm would reduce its
capital expenditures under capital-labor complementarities. Therefore, I control for
a firm’s labor adjustment by including net hiring rates in the basic specification:
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
= αi + αt + β1Qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
+ β3DWRi,t + β4NHRi,t + i,t (4.1)
where NHRi,t refers to firm i’s net hiring rate at t, which is given by NHRi,t =
Hi,t/[0.5×(Ni,t−1 +Ni,t)] in which Ni,t is the number of employees and net hiring, Hi,t,
is the change in the number of employees from year t =1 to year t, Hi,t = Ni,t−Ni,t−1.
In Panel A of Table A2, consistent with the view of capital-labor complementari-
ties, net hiring rates are strongly positively associated with capital expenditures. The
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coefficients on downward wage rigidity remain statistically significant at the 1% level,
and the magnitudes are similar to those in Panel A of Table 2 in all specifications.
A negative shock to cash flow might also require firms to reduce wages of job
stayers. Hence, separation rates are likely to be negatively associated with downward
wage rigidity. If capital and labor inputs are complements, then lower downward wage
rigidity (accompanied by higher layoffs) should be associated with lower investment,
which yields a positive relation between downward wage rigidity and investment.
Hence, layoff decisions are likely to bias my tests against finding a negative relation.
Nevertheless, I include firm-level hiring and separation rates in the following spec-
ification in order to re-examine the main results:
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
= αi + αt + β1Qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
+ β3DWRi,t + β4HRi,t + β5SRi,t + i,t (4.2)
where H(S)Ri,t refers to firm i’s hiring (separation) rate at t. Using the number of
employees variable from Compustat does not allow me to separately calculate hiring
rates and separation rates. Therefore I calculate H(S)Ri,t using hiring (separation)
rate data in the QWI from the U.S. Census Bureau (details in Section C).
Similar to Panel A of Table A2, Panel B presents robust negative effects of down-
ward wage rigidity on corporate investment after controlling for labor adjustment.
Again, hiring rates from the U.S. Census data are positively related to corporate
investment while separation rates have no significant association with capital expen-
ditures except in Column (3), which shows that layoffs are positively associated with
corporate investment.1
1A positive association between capital expenditures and layoffs might be due to a high correlation
between hiring and separation rates, about 0.88 in my sample.
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4.0.5 Effects of the Business Cycle and Inflation
Another concern relate to the baseline results is that the measures used here
may simply proxy for an economic downturn, which leads to lower corporate invest-
ment. If the measures capture the macroeconomic conditions of the entire U.S. econ-
omy, the year fixed effects will absorb this possibility. Moreover, Kurmann, McEntar-
fer, and Spletzer (2016) document that, during the recent financial crisis, downward
wage rigidity decreased and wage growth distribution became more symmetric. Con-
sistent with this finding, the cross-sectional average of my measure decreases during
NBER business cycle troughs. These empirical findings are also consistent with the
common notion that inflation is negatively associated with both future economic
output and downward wage rigidity. Therefore a relation between downward wage
rigidity and economic conditions, if any, is positive, which is likely to bias my tests
against finding a negative relation.
The impact of inflation on both downward wage rigidity and corporate investment
could raise another concern: that inflation drives the negative relation between them.
Indeed, Card and Hyslop (1997) document that downward rigidity of nominal wage
becomes weaker during a period of high inflation because firms set their workers’
wages more flexibly when inflation is anticipated. Therefore, if inflation stimulates
corporate investment, the negative effects reported in this paper could simply be
driven by inflation.
In general, inflation has two conflicting effects on corporate investment (Hochman
and Palmon, 1983): depreciation and interest effects. On the one hand, the real tax
benefit of depreciation decreases with inflation because depreciation allowances are
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based on historical costs rather than on current nominal values. On the other hand,
the real tax benefit of interest deductions increases with inflation because firms deduct
interest expenses at nominal interest rates rather than at real rates. Therefore it re-
mains an empirical question whether inflation increases or decreases corporate invest-
ment. Feldstein (1982) empirically finds that inflation is negatively associated with
firm investment under the structure of U.S. tax rules. Moreover, using an equilibrium
market valuation model, Chen and Boness (1975) show that the risk-standardized
cost of capital will be overstated (understated), hence leading to under-investment
(over-investment), if inflation (deflation) is expected. Therefore, inflation is likely to
reduce corporate investment, which biases my tests against finding a negative relation
between downward wage rigidity and investment.
4.0.6 Measurement Errors in Tobin’s q and the Downward Wage Rigidity Measure
The empirical proxies for marginal q (or investment opportunities) and down-
ward wage rigidity are likely to contain measurement errors. Using high-order cumu-
lant estimators (Erickson, Jiang, and Whited, 2014), I assess the robustness of the
link between downward wage rigidity and corporate investment when these proxies
are subject to measurement errors. In addition to Tobin’s q, I assume the mea-
sure of downward wage rigidity is measured with error because it is based on three-
dimensional measures that are estimated from the aggregated microdata.
In Column (1) of Table A3, I report the baseline fixed effect OLS estimators from
Column (2) of Panel A in Table 2 for comparison across estimations. Columns (2)-
(4) display Erickson, Jiang, and Whited (2014) higher-order cumulant estimators for
the fourth, fifth, and sixth cumulants. Consistent with Erickson, Jiang, and Whited
(2014), the coefficients on Tobin’s q (Cash Flow) based on the cumulant estimation
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are larger (smaller) than those from fixed effect OLS estimation. The coefficients
on downward wage rigidity remain significant for all orders of cumulants, and the
magnitude of the coefficients becomes even larger. Overall, these results ensure that
the relation between labor market frictions and investment is unlikely to be driven
by mismeasured Tobin’s q or the downward wage rigidity measure.
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Chapter 5
VALUE IMPLICATIONS: THE THEORY OF SECOND BEST
The analyses in Section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 show a strong negative impact of down-
ward wage rigidity on corporate investment using both the firm-level measure and
state-level changes in minimum wage laws. In this section I investigate the value
implications of labor market frictions in the context of corporate investment.
Consider a typical optimization problem, in which a firm maximizes shareholder
value. Imposing an additional friction (e.g., downward wage rigidity), which is bind-
ing, restricts the choice sets of the firm and seems to lower the value function. How-
ever, the theory of second best (Viner, 1950; Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) suggests
that this may not always be true. The newly added friction may partially counteract
the effect of existing frictions on investment (e.g., overinvestment due to overconfi-
dence or to agency problems). Note that if agency problems cause overinvestment,
the objective function may also include managers’ private benefits from growing a
firm. Therefore this countervailing effect could lead to more efficient outcomes by
allowing the firm to avoid value-destructive projects, thereby improving efficiency.
Testing this theoretical prediction is empirically challenging because researchers
cannot directly observe either investment efficiency or the optimal level of invest-
ment. Nonetheless, I conduct two indirect tests of investment efficiency across over-
and underinvesting firms using a modified version of valuation regression originally
developed by Fama and French (1998) and a revenue-based total factor productivity
growth regression following the approach of Kogan et al. (2016).
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5.0.7 Valuation Regressions
To examine the relation between labor market friction and firm value, I employ
a modified version of the valuation regression developed by Fama and French (1998).
Even though this method is ad hoc in the sense that it is not based on a theoretical
model’s functional form, it has been used in the literature because it explains a large
portion of the variation in firm value (e.g., Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006).
I estimate the following valuation regression separately for over- and underinvesting
groups:
Qi,t = αind + αt + β1Earningsi,t + β2∆Earningsi,t + β3∆Earningsi,t+1 + β4∆NAssetsi,t
(5.1)
+ β5∆NAssetsi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7∆RDi,t + β8∆RDi,t+1 + β9Ii,t + β10∆Interesti,t
+ β11∆Interesti,t+1 + β12Dividendsi,t + +β13∆Dividendsi,t + β14∆Dividendsi,t+1
+ β15∆Qi,t+1 + β16∆PP&Ei,t + β17∆PP&Ei,t+1 + β18DWRi,t + i,t
where Xt is the level of variable X in year t normalized by total assets in year t, ∆Xt
is the change in the level of X from year t =1 to t normalized by total assets in year
t (except for DWRi,t), (Xt − Xt−1)/At, and ∆Xt+1 is the change in the level of X
from year t to t+1 normalized by total assets in year t, (Xt+1 − Xt)/At where A is
the book value of total assets. PP&Et is gross property, plants, and equipment, and
CAPEXt is capital expenditures. Earnings is earnings before extraordinary items
plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits; NAssets is the book
value of total assets minus gross property, plants, and equipment; RD is research and
development expenditures; Interest is interest expense; and Dividends is common
dividends paid. αt is the set of year fixed effects, and αind is the set of industry fixed
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effects. β18 is of main interest, and it captures whether downward wage rigidity is
beneficial or detrimental to firms.
To identify whether firms over- or underinvest, I use the CEO overconfidence
measure (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Campbell et al., 2011) and the debt overhang
correction measure (Hennessy, 2004) in the main specifications. The overconfidence
measure captures the friction that comes from a manager’s inflated perception of
investment opportunities, and the debt overhang correction measure proxies for the
severity of debt overhang problem. Overly confident CEOs have a tendency to overin-
vest given level of cash flows; the top quintile of the debt overhang correction measure
proxies for underinvestment. The debt overhang correction measure is defined as the
total recovery value of long-term debt at default normalized by the total amount of
capital. Following Hennessy (2004), I use recovery ratios by three-digit SIC code from
Altman and Kishore (1996), and default probabilities by bond rating over a 20-year
horizon from Moody’s.
In Panel A of Table 4, a positive relation between downward wage rigidity and
firm value only shows up in overly confident group that is prone to overinvestment.
A one standard deviation increase (1.43%) in downward wage rigidity is associated
with a 3.79 (0.0143 × 2.6491) percentage point increase in Q for overly confident
group, which is 2.13% relative to the median Tobin’s q. These valuation regression
results of overinvesting firms imply that labor market frictions are not necessarily
detrimental to firm value because they might inhibit firms from engaging in waste-
ful expenditure. This countervailing effect is consistent with the theory of second best.
As a robustness check, I use residuals from the investment regression provided
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that it yields unbiased estimates of the optimal level of investment. Residuals are
sorted into quintiles. The bottom quintile proxies for underinvestment and the top
quintile proxies for overinvestment. Note, however, that this method is subject to
the joint hypothesis of model misspecification.1 In Columns (1) and (2) of Panel
A of Table A4, I report results that use residuals from the full-sample investment
regression with firm and year fixed effects. Similar to the results in Panel A of Table
4, only for overinvesting firms, downward wage rigidity is positively related to firm
value. Because using the full sample is subject to look-ahead bias, I use rolling (and
expanding) windows to estimate residuals in Columns (3) and (4). The results are
stronger, and the underinvesting group now exhibits a negative association between
downward wage rigidity and firm value.
I also use CEO tenure as an alternative measure of overinvestment in Panel B of
Table A4. Following Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016), I break a CEOs’ tenure into
three periods: years [0,2], years [3,5], and years 6 and after. Tenure Dummy years [3,5](years 6 and after)
is an indicator variable for the second (third) period in CEO tenure. A positive co-
efficient on DWR × Tenure Dummy years 6 and after is economically and statistically
significant. A one standard deviation increase (1.61%) in downward wage rigidity is
associated with a 2.84 (0.0161 × [1.3712 + 0.3926]) percentage point increase in To-
bin’s q for years 6 and after in a CEO’s tenure, which is 1.90% relative to the median
Tobin’s q. Consistent with Panel A of Table 4, these results imply that downward
wage rigidity is positively associated with firm value only in the later years of a CEO’s
tenure, which are prone to overinvestment owing to the agency problems.
1The main proxies for under- or overinvestment used in Table 4 are not subject to this joint
hypothesis because they do not depend on a specific investment regression model.
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However, the labor market friction is negatively associated with firm value when
firms are prone to underinvestment owing to debt overhang (Columns (3) and (4)
of Panel A in Table 4). A one standard deviation increase (1.80%) in the rigidity
measure is related to a 5.68 (0.0180 × 3.1560) percentage point decrease in Tobin’s
q for the top quintile debt overhang correction group, which is 4.78% relative to the
median Tobin’s q. This implies that facing additional friction in the labor market
reduces firm value when a firm already suffers from debt overhang that are caused
by the long-term debt it holds. Overall, valuation regression results provide evidence
that is consistent with the theory of second best: labor market friction could yield
more efficient outcomes by adjusting investment closer to the optimal level.
5.0.8 Total Factor Productivity Growth
The results in Section 5.0.7 rely on the market’s assessment of a firm, which
does not necessarily reflect the true changes in a firm’s fundamentals. To verify
whether the firm fundamentals indeed change along with downward wage rigidity, I
examine revenue-based total factor productivity (TFP) growth. TFP is a measure of
efficiency in production that does not depend on the use of observable factor inputs.
Essentially, an increase in TFP implies a northeast shift in the isoquants of a produc-
tion function: an increase in output given the same amount of observable inputs. If
a firm’s TFP growth is systematically associated with the labor market friction, this
finding sheds some light on a mechanism through which the labor market friction can
be beneficial to firm value.
I follow an approach similar that used by Kogan et al. (2016) and estimate the
following fixed effect regression separately for over- and underinvesting groups using
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CEO overconfidence and debt overhang correction measures:
TFPi,t − TFPi,t−1 = αind + αt + β1DWRi,t + β2Xi,t−1 + i,t (5.2)
where TFPi,t refers to firm i’s revenue-based total factor productivity at t, DWRi,t
is the downward wage rigidity measure defined in Section 2, αind is a set of industry
fixed effects, αt is a set of year fixed effects, and Xi,t−1 is a set of firm-level control
variables at t =1: ln(PP&E), ln(EMP ), Q, Leverage, Profitability, ln(ME) and
ln(age). I construct a revenue-based TFP measure following the methodology of Olley
and Pakes (1996) and the procedure of I˙mrohorog˘lu and Tu¨zel (2014).2 ln(PP&E)
is the log of capital stock, ln(EMP ) is the log of number of employees, ln(ME) is
the log of market value of equity, and ln(age) is the log of firm age. I measure Q
as a ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, Leverage as book value
of total debt normalized by book value of assets, and Profitability as income be-
fore extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization divided by book value of
assets. I add additional controls based on the results in I˙mrohorog˘lu and Tu¨zel (2014).
Panel B of Table 4 displays the results of the estimation. Consistent with the
results from valuation regressions in Section 5.0.7, downward wage rigidity is posi-
tively (negatively) associated with TFP growth for the overly confident CEO group
(those in the top quintile of debt overhang correction). A one standard deviation
increase (1.42%) in downward wage rigidity is associated with a 0.65% (0.0142 ×
0.4560) increase in revenue-based productivity of overinvesting firms (Column (2)),
whereas the same increase (1.63%) is related to a 1.60% (0.0163 × 0.9790) decrease
in productivity of underinvesting firms (Column (4)).
2I thank Selale Tuzel for providing codes for estimating TFPs on her website: http://www-bcf.
usc.edu/~tuzel/.
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Taken together, the results from Section 5.0.7 and 5.0.8 suggest that labor market
frictions do not always destroy firm value or production efficiency. Firms that have a
tendency to overinvest owing to certain frictions could be better off when they also face
labor market frictions: these labor market frictions partially counteract the existing
ones and lead to a more efficient outcome by helping firms to avoid value-destructive
projects.
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Chapter 6
MECHANISMS
I examine two potential mechanisms through which downward wage rigidity re-
duces corporate investment: the debt overhang channel and the operating leverage
channel. Both channels rely on the argument that downward wage rigidity converts
a wage claim into a debt-like contract that requires firms to pay a fixed amount even
though the marginal productivity of labor falls below the current wage. As a result,
downward wage rigidity exacerbates the debt overhang problem and increases oper-
ating leverage. The operating leverage channel is motivated by the existing literature
on the crowding-out effect of operating leverage. Specifically, downward wage rigidity
increases operating leverage, which will prevent a firm from using financial leverage
when the firm needs to finance its investment. This in turn decreases the ability to
finance new investment, and thus decreases capital expenditures. Notice that these
two channels are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive. I provide some supporting
evidence for these channels.
6.0.9 Debt Overhang Channel
Downward Wage Rigidity and the Likelihood of Default
An ideal approach to testing the debt overhang channel would be to gauge the
effective amount of debt that includes a debt-like contract (e.g., a wage claim in
the presence of downward wage rigidity). However, it is challenging to estimate the
amount. Instead, I conduct an indirect test by examining the future likelihood of
default. The idea is that if downward wage rigidity converts a wage claim into a
44
debt-like contract, it will increase a firm’s default risk for a given amount of actual
debt on the financial statement. To assess the relation between downward wage rigid-
ity and default rates, I run a fixed effect regression of future defaults on downward
wage rigidity. Using the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, I construct
a default indicator that equals 1 if a firm defaults within the next five years. I include
controls following Hovakimian, Kayhan, and Titman (2012).
Column (1) in Panel A of Table 5 shows the result for estimating the fixed effect
logistic regression of default indicator on downward wage rigidity, which is estimated
using a conditional logistic specification. Controlling for leverage, firms with more
downward rigid wages are more likely to default. Column (2) and (3) use linear
probability models with industry and firm fixed effects, respectively. The results
are robust. These findings are consistent with those of D’Acunto et al. (2015), who
document that firms with inflexible output prices are more likely to default.
6.0.10 Operating Leverage Channel
Does Downward Wage Rigidity Increase Operating Leverage?
In the presence of downward wage rigidity, a firm’s wage does not fall as much
as labor productivity does when there is a negative shock, which makes the firm’s
earnings more volatile: the firm’s earnings becomes more responsive to a given per-
centage change in sales. When risk is higher, the firm has less capacity to make new
investments. Moreover, operating leverage will crowd out financial leverage, which
eventually decreases the firm’s ability to finance its investment and thus decreases
capital expenditures.
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Using an approach similar to that used in Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), I
estimate the sensitivity of changes in earnings to changes in sales, and examine how
downward wage rigidity affects this sensitivity:
∆ln EBITi,t = αi + αt + β1∆ln Yi,t + β2DWRi,t + β3∆ln Yi,t ×DWRi,t + i,t (6.1)
where ∆ ln EBIT is a change in the log earnings before interest and taxes and ∆
lnY is a change in the log sales.
Panel B of Table 5 provides evidence that is consistent with the operating leverage
mechanism. In the absence of downward wage rigidity, given a percentage change in
sales, earnings change by 1.06% (Column (2)). A one standard deviation increase
(1.69%) in downward wage rigidity is associated with an additional 0.05% (0.0169 ×
3.1159) movement in earnings, which is an almost 5% increase relative to the baseline
case (1.06%). Therefore the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically and
economically significant, which supports the operating leverage channel that links
downward wage rigidity to investment
Interaction Effects of Labor Market Frictions and Financing Frictions
As shown in the previous section (Section 6.0.10), downward wage rigidity leads
to greater operating leverage. This heightened operating leverage will crowd out fi-
nancial leverage (e.g., Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin, 2015; Serfling, 2016), and as a result,
a firm’s ability to finance its investment decreases. These financing constraints cause
the firm to reduce investment. If the negative effect of downward wage rigidity on
investment is due to the operating leverage channel, I would expect the negative ef-
fect to be more acute for firms that are financially constrained. In this section, I
investigate the interaction effect of labor market frictions and financing frictions on
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corporate investment to shed light on a mechanism through which downward wage
rigidity affects investment.
A large body of investment literature proposes a number of financial constraint
measures (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Whited and Wu, 2006; Hadlock and Pierce,
2010). However, several studies cast doubt on the appropriateness or coherence of
those measures. For example, Hennessy and Whited (2007) find that many commonly
used ways of measuring financing constraints actually classify firms as less financially
constrained as they increase financing cost parameters when generating simulated
data. They point out that those measures may represent an endogenous response to
the firms’ actual financing conditions, either the cost of external funds or the need for
funds. Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) report low correlations among these common
financial constraint measures and propose an alternative text-based measure using
the information from 10-Ks.
Instead of relying on these financing constraint measures that are prone to endo-
geneity concerns, I use maturing long-term debt as an identification tool, which was
first proposed by Almeida et al. (2012). This strategy exploits heterogeneity in the
maturity of long-term debt, which was issued 2, 3, and 4 years before the year of
interest, across and within firms.1 The advantage of using this method is whether a
firm had to refinance its long-term debt is plausibly exogenous to its current outcomes
or decisions. Exogeneity comes from the fact that long-term debt is typically difficult
to renegotiate on short notice in part because of a dispersed creditor structure.
1Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2011) use a similar strategy to examine the effect of finance on
employment.
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For groups of firms with the same level of downward wage rigidity, I examine
whether firms with long-term debt maturing in the following year reduce their invest-
ment by more than firms not required to refinance their long-term debt. Equivalently,
for firms that need to refinance, I investigate whether firms with a high level of down-
ward wage rigidity reduce their investment by more than firms with a low level of
downward wage rigidity.
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
= αi + αt + β1Qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ki,t−1
+ β3DWRi,t (6.2)
+ β41LTDi,t>threshold + β51LTDi,t>threshold ×DWRi,t + i,t
where 1LTDi,t>threshold is a dummy variable indicating financing constraints based on
the amount of long-term debt (LTD) maturing in the following year that was issued
before 2, 3, and 4 years ago. I use three different thresholds to define the dummy vari-
ables. Thresholds of 0% and 1% of total assets are somewhat arbitrary even though
such a fixed number is used in the literature. However, firms in a certain industry
might inherently have a large amount of long-term debt, which makes fixed num-
ber thresholds meaningless to those firms. Therefore I also use a time-series median
of maturing long-term debt within a firm as an alternative threshold, which varies
across firms. This alternative threshold could be a long-run average of the amount
of long-term debt maturing in the following year. If LTD is greater (less) than the
threshold, a firm becomes more (less) financially constrained.
Table 6 presents the interaction effects of downward wage rigidity and financing
frictions on corporate investment decisions. Consistent with the findings in the liter-
ature, firms with long-term debt maturing in the following year invest substantially
less during the current year. Column (1) shows that firms decrease their investment
rates by 2.56 percentage points, which is about 14% relative to the median invest-
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ment rate. When firms also face downward wage rigidity, they further decrease their
investment. A one standard deviation increase (1.71%) in downward wage rigidity
is associated with an additional 0.78 (0.0171 × 0.4571) percentage point decrease in
the investment rate, more than a 4% decrease of the median investment rate. Us-
ing different thresholds yields qualitatively similar results as shown in the remaining
columns.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
This paper studies the effect of labor market frictions on corporate investment de-
cisions. I construct a firm-level, time-varying downward wage rigidity measure using
aggregated Census data and show that firms reduce investment when they face labor
market frictions. Exploiting variation in state-level minimum wage rates as shocks
to downward wage rigidity, I find that, following an increase in the minimum wage,
firms reduce their investment rate by 1.17 percentage points. The negative impact of
downward wage rigidity is more acute for firms with a higher fraction of minimum
wage workers, higher employment protection, higher labor intensity, or stickier prod-
uct prices. These findings suggest that labor market frictions drive the main results.
Remarkably, I find that, among firms that overinvest, investment cuts due to
downward wage rigidity enhance firm value and production efficiency. This result pro-
vides suggestive evidence that labor market friction partially counteracts the effect of
other frictions (e.g., agency problems or managerial overconfidence) on investment by
inhibiting firms from initiating value destructive projects. This countervailing effect
is consistent with the theory of second best. However, firms that underinvest perform
worse when facing labor market frictions.
To shed light on mechanisms through which downward wage rigidity affects in-
vestment, I show that downward wage rigidity increases a firm’s default risk and
magnifies its operating leverage. These results are consistent with the notion that
downward wage rigidity essentially converts a wage claim into a debt-like contract
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that requires firms to pay a fixed amount even though the marginal product of labor
falls below the current wages. As a result, downward wage rigidity exacerbates the
debt overhang problem. Moreover, heightened operating leverage will prevent firms
from using financial leverage, which in turn decreases their ability to finance new
investment.
The evidence from this study implies that labor market frictions, particularly the
inability or unwillingness of firms to adjust wages downward, are important drivers of
corporate investment. It also suggests that labor market frictions could play a positive
role in improving outcomes by curbing overinvestment when firms are also subject
to overinvestment-related frictions. In addition, it has important policy implications
by pointing out the unintended consequences of minimum wage policy on corporate
investment. More broadly, this paper is part of a larger research agenda designed
to investigate the interdependence of corporate policies with labor markets and to
provide insights into how labor markets affect corporate policies, firm value, and
production efficiency.
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Figure 1: Measuring Downward Wage Rigidity
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This figure plots the basic concept of downward wage rigidity measures used in Lebow, Stockton,
and Wascher (1995) and Kurmann, McEntarfer, and Spletzer (2016). X-axis is the log wage growth
and Y-axis shows density. Blue solid line indicates a notional (rigidity free) distribution of wage
growth whereas red line is an empirical counterpart. The notional distribution is drawn from normal
distribution with a mean of four and a standard deviation of three for illustrative purposes. Detailed
definitions of downward wage rigidity measures are described in Section 2 and B.
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Figure 3: Additional Source of Unemployment through Investment Cut: Policy
Implication
Demand1
Supply
Employment
Wage
L∗
w∗
wmin
Ld1 Ls
Demand2
Ld2
Additional Unemployment
This figure illustrates an additional source of employment reduction through forgone corpo-
rate investment triggered by minimum wage increase. Demand1 represents the demand curve
in the absence of minimum wage policy. Equilibrium occurs when supply equals demand, which
generates the competitive employment L∗ and wage w∗. Once the government imposes a minimum
wage (wmin), which is greater than w
∗, Ld1 will be the new level of employment that is lower
than L∗. My findings suggest that this might not be the whole story of minimum wage effect.
The investment cut resulting from the minimum wage increase will shift demand curve to the left
(Demand2), which amplifies employment reduction on the top of imposing minimum wage itself.
Ld1 − Ld2 is the additional unemployment due to the investment cut. As a caveat, note that this
graphical illustration is simplistic in that it does not take into account general-equilibrium effects
of minimum wage increase on factor or output prices.
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Table 1: Measures of Downward Wage Rigidity and Validity Tests (continued)
Panel C presents results from validity tests on downward wage rigidity measure. I run the first
difference regressions of changes in DWR (in percentage) on a dummy variable indicating minimum
wage increase. I use the historical changes in minimum wages under state laws reported by the
Tax Policy Center. The Tax Policy Center uses data from the Wage and Hour Division (WHD)
in the U.S. Department of Labor and from the Monthly Labor Review by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. In cases where an employee is subject to both the state and federal minimum wage laws,
the employee is entitled to the higher of the two under Section 18 of the Fair Labor Standard Act. I
exclude 15 states that have indexed their minimum wage rates to inflation for the reason discussed
in Section 3.1.2. 1∆ws,t−1>0 is a dummy variable indicating minimum wage increase at time t =1
in state s where a firm’s headquarters is located. Industries that are most (or least) subject to
minimum wages are defined as those with above (or below) median percentage of hourly workers
with earnings at or below the prevailing federal minimum wage as of 2015. Minimum wage workers
data comes from the Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The sample period runs from 1994 to 2014 Q3. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by state.
Panel C. Validity Tests of Downward Wage Rigidity Measure: Using Changes in
Minimum Wage Laws in the States
Dependent Variable: ∆(DWR)
Full Sample Industries Least Industries Most
Subject to Min Wage Subject to Min Wage
(1) (2) (3)
1∆ws,t−1>0 .0885 .0255 .2596
∗∗∗
(.0789) (.0947) (.0827)
H0: 1∆ws,t−1>0 in (2) - (3) = 0 -0.2341
∗∗∗
[p-value] [.0068]
Year FE Y Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 38,560 28,422 9,533
Adjusted R2 .0968 .0995 .1141
62
Table 1: Measures of Downward Wage Rigidity and Validity Tests (continued)
Panel D provides descriptive statistics for firm-year observations from 1994 to 2014 Q3. Low DWR
and High DWR groups are based on the median DWR for every year. Column (3) shows mean
differences in variables between Low DWR and High DWR groups. Detailed definition of each
variable is reported in Section D. Log Assets is the log book value of assets converted into December
2012 constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) inflation
rates, Investment is defined as capital expenditures normalized by the beginning-of-the-year
capital stock (property, plants, and equipment), R&D as research and development expenditures
normalized by the beginning-of-the-year capital stock, NHR as net hiring rates, Cash Flow as
earnings before extraordinary items plus depreciation normalized by the beginning-of-the-year
capital stock, Q as a ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, Cash as cash
and short-term investments normalized by book value of assets, Profitability as income before
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization normalized by book value of assets, and
Leverage as book value of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities normalized by book value
of assets. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel D. Firm-Year Observations: Low DWR vs. High DWR
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Mean
Low DWR High DWR (2)-(1)
DWR(%) 0.2026 2.0223 1.8197 ∗∗∗
Log Assets 6.6975 6.7496 0.0522∗∗∗
Investment 0.2634 0.2633 -0.0002
R&D 0.1949 0.2339 0.0390∗∗∗
NHR(Net Hiring Rate) 0.0286 0.0310 0.0024
Cash Flow 0.3265 0.3761 0.0496∗∗∗
Q 1.6488 1.7298 0.0810∗∗∗
Cash 0.1280 0.1358 0.0078∗∗∗
Profitability 0.0561 0.0609 0.0048∗∗∗
Leverage 0.2883 0.2832 -0.0051∗∗∗
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Table 2: The Effects of Downward Wage Rigidity on Corporate Investment
Panel A presents fixed effect OLS regressions of corporate investment on downward wage rigidity
measure (DWR). I use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators from the U.S. Census Bureau to
construct the measure. Detailed definitions are reported in Section 2. The dependent variables
are Investment measured as capital expenditures normalized by the beginning-of-the-year capital
stock (property, plants, and equipment). I measure Cash Flow as earnings before extraordinary
items plus depreciation normalized by the beginning-of-the-year capital stock and Q as a ratio of
market value of assets to book value of assets. Column (3) uses firm-year observations with positive
downward wage rigidity measure. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered by firm.
Panel A. Using Downward Wage Rigidity Measure
Dependent Variable: Corporate Investment
With Dummy Without Dummy
Full Cond. on ∃ DR
(1) (2) (3)
1DWR>0 .0026
(.0023)
DWR -.1958∗∗∗ -.1693∗∗∗ -.2462∗∗∗
(.0548) (.0515) (.0584)
Cash Flow .0382∗∗∗ .0382∗∗∗ .0441∗∗∗
(.0023) (.0023) (.0030)
Q .0764∗∗∗ .0764∗∗∗ .0741∗∗∗
(.0022) (.0022) (.0025)
Firm and Year FE Y Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 69,661 69,661 51,060
Adjusted R2 .1713 .1713 .1757
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Table 3: Conditional Analysis by Labor Intensity and Product Price Stickiness:
Differential Effects of Downward Wage Rigidity on Corporate Investment
Panel A presents fixed effect OLS regression results conditional on labor intensity. Column (1) is
based on the least labor-intensive firms whereas Column (2) uses the most labor-intensive firms.
I define labor intensity as a ratio of labor costs to sales. I first calculate median value of these
ratios for a given SIC industry every year, then sort all industries into quintiles based on the time
series median of each industry’s labor intensity. I use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators from the
U.S. Census Bureau to construct the DWR measure. Detailed definitions are reported in Section
2. The dependent variables are Investment measured as capital expenditures normalized by the
beginning-of-the-year capital stock. I measure Cash Flow as earnings before extraordinary items
plus depreciation normalized by the beginning-of-the-year capital stock and Q as a ratio of market
value of assets to book value of assets.
Panel A. Labor Intensity
Dependent Variable: Corporate Investment
Least Labor Intensive Firms Most Labor Intensive Firms
(1) (2)
DWR -.0325 -.3235∗∗
(.0930) (.1367)
Cash Flow .0499∗∗∗ .0270∗∗∗
(.0064) (.0041)
Q .0917∗∗∗ .0752∗∗∗
(.0072) (.0043)
H0: DWRLeast - DWRMost = 0 0.2910
∗∗
[p-value] [.0391]
Firm and Year FE Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 13,371 12,761
Adjusted R2 .1393 .1863
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Table 3: Conditional Analysis by Labor Intensity and Product Price Stickiness:
Differential Effects of Downward Wage Rigidity on Corporate Investment (continued)
Panel B presents fixed effect OLS regression results conditional on product price stickiness. Column
(1) and (2) are based on the inverse of the volatility of PPI (Producer Price Index) growth while the
remaining columns are based on the frequency of price adjustment (FPA). To construct these mea-
sures, I use monthly PPI data by NAICS 5-digit industries from the BLS. Using a similar method
used in Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016), I define industry-level FPA as a fraction of months with
PPI changes during the sample period. PPI changes are defined as observations with PPI growth
greater than 0.5% or less than -0.5%. These product price stickiness measures are then sorted into
terciles. [p−value] below H0: DWRLeast - DWRMost = 0 is based on a one-tailed test. The sample
period runs from 1994 to 2014 Q3. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedastic-
ity and clustered by firm. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel B. Product Price Stickiness
Dependent Variable: Corporate Investment
Least Sticky Most Sticky Least Sticky Most Sticky
(Low 1vol(∆PPI) ) (High
1
vol(∆PPI) ) (High FPA) (Low FPA)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DWR -.0552 -.2594∗∗ -.0439 -.2211∗
(.0642) (.1202) (.0660) (.1205)
Cash Flow .0488∗∗∗ .0477∗∗∗ .0409∗∗∗ .0447∗∗∗
(.0104) (.0041) (.0098) (.0038)
Q .0911∗∗∗ .0737∗∗∗ .0896∗∗∗ .0745∗∗∗
(.0054) (.0039) (.0055) (.0038)
H0: DWRLeast - DWRMost = 0 0.2042
∗ 0.1772∗
[p-value] [.0665] [.0980]
Firm and Year FE Y Y Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 17,470 19,782 16,705 19,905
Adjusted R2 .1532 .1996 .1491 .1985
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Table 4: Downward Wage Rigidity, Firm Value and Production Efficiency: Differen-
tial Effects Across Over- and Underinvestment Using CEO Overconfidence and Debt
Overhang Correction
Panel A presents the results from a modified version of the valuation regression developed by
Fama and French (1998), a fixed effect OLS regression of Tobin’s q on downward wage rigidity
for overinvestment and underinvestment groups. I use CEO overconfidence measure (Campbell
et al., 2011) to identify firms that are prone to overinvestment. To identify firms that are likely to
underinvest, I construct debt overhang correction measure of Hennessy (2004), total recovery value
of long-term debt at default normalized by total amount of capital. The measure is then sorted
into quintiles. Tobin’s q is defined as a ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets.
I use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators from the U.S. Census Bureau to construct the DWR
measure. Detailed definitions are reported in Section 2. The control variables are: Earningst,
∆Earningst, ∆Earningst+1, ∆PP&Et, ∆PP&Et+1, ∆NAssetst, ∆NAssetst+1, RDt, ∆RDt,
∆RDt+1, Interestt, ∆Interestt, ∆Interestt+1, Dividendst, ∆Dividendst, ∆Dividendst+1, and
∆Qt+1 where Xt is the level of variable X in year t normalized by total assets in year t. ∆Xt is the
change in the level of X from year t =1 to t normalized by total assets in year t, (Xt −Xt−1)/At,
and ∆Xt+1 is the change in the level of X from year t to t+1 normalized by total assets in
year t, (Xt+1 − Xt)/At where A is the book value of total assets. Earnings is earnings before
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits; PP&E is gross
property, plants, and equipment; NAssets is the book value of total assets minus gross property,
plants, and equipment; RD is research and development expenditures; Interest is interest expense;
and Dividends is common dividends paid.
Panel A. Valuation Regression Using Tobin’s q
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s q
Overinvestment Underinvestment
(CEO Overconfidence) (Debt Overhang Correction)
Low/Moderate High Q1 Q5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DWR .5022 2.6491∗∗ .0229 -3.1560∗
(.5836) (1.0739) (1.1942) (1.7246)
H0: DWRHigh/Q5 −DWRLow/Q1 = 0 2.1469∗∗ -3.1789∗∗
[p-value] [0.0161] [0.0213]
Controls / Industry and Year FE Y Y Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 9045 7462 722 807
Adjusted R2 .3909 .364 .3941 .2683
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Table 4: Downward Wage Rigidity, Firm Value and Production Efficiency: Differen-
tial Effects Across Over- and Underinvestment Using CEO Overconfidence and Debt
Overhang Correction (continued)
Panel B presents the results from fixed effect OLS regressions of revenue-based total factor
productivity (TFP) growth on downward wage rigidity for overinvestment and underinvestment
groups. TFP is constructed using the methodology of Olley and Pakes (1996) and the procedure
of I˙mrohorog˘lu and Tu¨zel (2014). The control variables are: ln(PP&E), ln(EMP ), Q, Leverage,
Profitability, ln(ME) and ln(age). ln(PP&E) is the log of capital stock, ln(EMP ) is the log
of number of employees, ln(ME) is the log of market value of equity, and ln(age) is the log of
firm age. I measure Leverage as book value of total debt normalized by book value of assets, and
Profitability as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization divided
by book value of assets. [p − value] below H0: DWRHigh/Q5 - DWRLow/Q1 = 0 is based on a
one-tailed test. The sample period runs from 1994 to 2014 Q3. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by industry (SIC 2-digit). ***, **, * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel B. Total Factor Productivity Growth
Dependent Variable: TFP Growth
Overinvestment Underinvestment
(CEO Overconfidence) (Debt Overhang Correction)
Low/Moderate High Q1 Q5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DWR .0341 .4560∗∗ .2095 -.9790∗∗∗
(.1593) (.1963) (.3659) (.3178)
H0: DWRHigh/Q5 −DWRLow/Q1 = 0 0.4219∗ -1.1885∗∗
[p-value] [0.0595] [0.0154]
Controls / Industry and Year FE Y Y Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 8,614 7,009 610 630
Adjusted R2 .0373 .0613 .0385 .0246
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Table 5: Mechanisms: Debt Overhang and Operating Leverage
Panel A presents fixed effect regressions of future defaults on downward wage rigidity. The
dependent variable is a binary variable which equals 1 if a firm defaults within the next five years.
I use bankruptcy filing information from the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database. To
construct DWR, I use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators from the U.S. Census Bureau. Detailed
definitions are reported in Section 2. Control variables are: Market-to-Book, Tangibility, RD, Selling
Expense, Profitability, Leverage, ln(Sales), and ln(age). I define Market-to-Book as a ratio of market
value of assets to book value of assets, Tangibility as net property, plant, and equipment scaled
by book value of assets, RD as research and development expense scaled by book value of assets,
Selling Expense as selling, general, and administrative expense over sales, Profitability as income
before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization divided by book value of assets,
Leverage as book value of total debt normalized by book value of assets, ln(Sales) as the log of
sales, and ln(age) as the log of firm age. Column (1) reports results from fixed effect logit regression
that are estimated using a conditional logit specification whereas Column (2) and (3) use linear
probability models with fixed effects. The sample period runs from 1994 to 2007. Standard errors
in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by either industry (SIC 2-digit) or firm.
Panel A. Debt Overhang Channel: Downward Wage Rigidity and Likelihood of
Default
Dependent Variable: 1{firm defaults within the next five years}
Conditional Logit Linear Prob. Model Linear Prob. Model
(1) (2) (3)
DWR 4.9321∗∗∗ .1084∗∗ .0551∗
(1.7981) (.0502) (.0299)
Q -.6926∗∗∗ -.0027∗∗ -.0012
(.1248) (.0011) (.0009)
Tangibility -.5361 -.0162∗ .0114
(.3771) (.0096) (.0142)
Profitability -2.2847∗∗∗ -.0909∗∗∗ .0040
(.3221) (.0199) (.0099)
Selling Expense .3461 .0017 .0057
(.5330) (.0109) (.0087)
ln(Sales) .2592∗∗∗ .0049∗∗∗ .0095∗∗∗
(.0324) (.0010) (.0031)
Leverage 3.1809∗∗∗ .0998∗∗∗ .1212∗∗∗
(.2338) (.0108) (.0130)
ln(age) -.0518 -.0016 -.0004
(.0710) (.0017) (.0050)
RD -4.0360 -.0676∗ .0147
(2.5345) (.0400) (.0323)
Fixed Effects Industry & Year Industry & Year Firm & Year
SE clustered by Industry Industry Firm
# of Firm-Year Obs. 50,701 52,557 52,567
Pseudo (or Adjusted) R2 .1279 .0312 .0226
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Table 5: Mechanisms: Debt Overhang and Operating Leverage (continued)
Panel B presents fixed effect OLS regressions of change in the log earnings before interest and taxes,
∆ ln EBIT , on change in the log sales, ∆ lnY . I interact the log sales with DWR. The sample
period runs from 1994 to 2014 Q3. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedastic-
ity and clustered by firm. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel B. Operating Leverage Channel
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln EBIT
With Dummy Without Dummy
(1) (2)
∆ ln Y 1.0541∗∗∗ 1.0648∗∗∗
(.0404) (.0289)
1DWR>0 -.0137
(.0091)
1DWR>0 × ∆ ln Y .0189
(.0505)
DWR .4788∗ .3352
(.2662) (.2448)
DWR × ∆ ln Y 2.8881∗ 3.1159∗∗
(1.5184) (1.3440)
Firm and Year FE Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 69,993 69,993
Adjusted R2 .1001 .1000
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APPENDIX B
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF DOWNWARD WAGE RIGIDITY
74
I construct the following three alternative measures (γ, η, and ζ) of downward
wage rigidity. For each firm-size and year-quarter pair, I calculate firm-size-level
downward wage rigidity measures using a rich set of cross-sectional data on wage
growth at state × NAICS 4 digit × employee gender × employee age level.
γd,t =
∫ ∞
2·medd,t+0.005
fd,t(x)dx−
∫ −0.005
−∞
fd,t(x)dx (B.1)
ηd,t =
∫ 0.005
−0.005
fd,t(x)dx−
∫ 2·medd,t+0.005
2·medd,t−0.005
fd,t(x)dx
ζd,t =
[
0.5−
∫ 0.005
−∞
fd,t(x)dx
]
−
[∫ 2·medd,t−0.005
−∞
fd,t(x)dx− 0.5
]
where d ∈ {fs (firm size), ind (industry), st (state)}
where fd,t and medd,t refer to an empirical probability density function of the log
wage growth and a median of the same distribution for a given dimension (d) at
year-quarter (t), respectively. γ essentially compare the cumulative frequency of the
log wage growth above twice the median and that below zero wage growth. Hence it
measures missing mass left-of-zero wage growth whereas η measures a spike at zero
and ζ measures excess mass right of zero (see Figure 1). Since the observational unit
is a group of employees, I calculate number-of-employees weighted medians.
To construct a firm-level measure, I first calculate, for a given firm, the value-
weighted average of industry-level downward wage rigidity measures (Equation B.1)
across the business segments in which the firm operates. I use sales from the Com-
pustat Segment files as weights. Then I define the firm-level measure as an average
of three-dimensional (firm-size, industry, headquarters state) measures as follows:
γi,t =
1
3
[
γfs=fsi,t +
∑
indj
Salesi,indj ,t · γind=indj ,t∑
indj
Salesi,indj ,t
+ γst=sti,t
]
(B.2)
where fsi indicates firm i’s firm size group as of t, indj denotes each industry segment
of firm i, Salesi,indj ,t is sales amount of industry segment j in firm i at t, and sti refers
to the state where firm i’s headquarters is located. ηi,t and ζi,t are similarly defined.
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APPENDIX C
HIRING / SEPARATION RATES
76
I calculate firm-level hiring (separation) rates using hiring (separation) rate data
in the Quarterly Workforce Indicator from the U.S. Census Bureau. Hiring (sepa-
ration) rate is defined as hirings (separations) as a fraction of average employment,
2 × HirAEnd(SepBeg)t/(Empt + EmpEndt), where HirAEnd(SepBeg)t indicates
the number of workers who started a new job in a given quarter (whose job in the
previous quarter continued and ended in the given quarter), Empt (EmpEndt) is a
total number of jobs on the first (last) day of the reference quarter.
Hiring (separation) rate data are available only at the aggregate level. Using a sim-
ilar method of constructing downward wage rigidity measures, I first calculate median
hiring (separation) rates for three dimensions: firm size, four-digit NAICS industry,
and state. Then, I average these three hiring (separation) rates associated with a firm
to obtain firm-level hiring (separation) rates where segment-sales weighted industry
level hiring (separation) rates are used for the industry dimension (see Equation 2.4).
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APPENDIX D
OTHER VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
78
Variables Definition (variables in brackets refer to Com-
pustat designations where appropriate)
Investment capital expenditures [CAPX] normalized by
the beginning-of-the-year capital stock (prop-
erty, plants, and equipment) [PPENT]
Cash Flow earnings before extraordinary items [IB]
plus depreciation [DP] normalized by the
beginning-of-the-year capital stock [PPENT]
Q Tobin’s q: ratio of market value of assets to
book value of assets [AT] where market value
of assets is defined as total assets [AT] plus
market equity minus book equity in which
market equity is defined as common shares
outstanding [CSHO] times fiscal-year clos-
ing price [PRCC F]; book equity is calcu-
lated as stockholders equity [SEQ] minus pre-
ferred stock liquidating value [PSTKL] plus
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment
tax credit [TXDITC] when available minus
post-retirement assets [PPROR] when avail-
able
∆ ln EBIT changes in the log earnings before interest and
taxes [EBIT]
∆ ln Y changes in the log sales [SALE]
PP&E gross property, plants, and equipment
[PPEGT] normalized by book value of assets
[AT]
Earnings earnings before extraordinary items [IB] plus
interest [XINT], deferred tax credits [TXDI],
and investment tax credits [ITCI] normalized
by book value of assets [AT]
NAssets book value of total assets [AT] minus gross
property, plants, and equipment [PPEGT]
normalized by book value of assets [AT]
RD research and development expenditures
[XRD] normalized by book value of assets
[AT]
Interest interest expense [XINT] normalized by book
value of assets [AT]
Dividends common dividends paid [DVC] normalized by
book value of assets [AT]
Leverage book value of long-term debt [DLTT] plus
debt in current liabilities [DLC] normalized
by book value of assets [AT]
Size book value of assets [AT]
Profitability income before extraordinary items [IB] plus
depreciation and amortization [DP] normal-
ized by book value of assets [AT]
79
Cash cash and short-term investment [CHE] nor-
malized by book value of assets [AT]
ln(Sales) the log of sales [SALE]
ln(PP&E) the log of capital stock (property, plants, and
equipment) [PPENT]
ln(ME) the log of market value of equity where mar-
ket value of equity is defined as common
shares outstanding [CSHO] times fiscal-year
closing price [PRCC F]
ln(EMP) the log of number of employees [EMP]
Tangibility net property, plants, and equipment
[PPENT] nomalized by book value of
assets [AT]
Selling Expense selling, general, and administrative expense
[XSGA] nomalized by sales [SALE]
NHR net hiring rates: NHRt = Ht/[0.5× (Nt−1 +
Nt)] where Nt is the number of employees
[EMP], and net hiring, Ht, is the change in
the number of employees from year t =1 to
year t (Ht = Nt −Nt−1)
Labor Intensity total staff expense [XLR] over sales [SALE]
Wrongful Discharge Law Score number of exceptions each state recognizes as
of 1994 among the three common law excep-
tions to the traditional employment at-will
rule: good faith, implied contract, and pub-
lic policy exceptions (data source: Serfling
(2016)) Note that Louisiana has a score of
0 before 1998 and a score of 1 since 1998.
CEO Overconfidence CEO overconfidence measure of Campbell
et al. (2011)
Debt Overhang Correction Debt overhang correction measure of Hen-
nessy (2004): total recovery value of long-
term debt at default normalized by total
amount of capital, calculated using recovery
ratios by three-digit SIC code from Altman
and Kishore (1996), and default probabilities
by bond rating over a 20-year horizon from
Moody’s
TFP revenue-based total factor productivity, con-
structed using the methodology of Olley
and Pakes (1996) and the procedure of
I˙mrohorog˘lu and Tu¨zel (2014)
1
vol(∆PPI)
inverse of the volatility of monthly PPI (Pro-
ducer Price Index) growth
80
FPA frequency of price adjustment, constructed
using a similar methodology of Gorod-
nichenko and Weber (2016): a fraction of
months with PPI changes during the sample
period where PPI changes are defined as ob-
servations PPI growth greater than 0.5% or
less than -0.5%
1{firm defaults within the next five years} binary variable which equals 1 if a firm
defaults within the next five years, con-
structed using bankruptcy filing information
from the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Re-
search Database
1LTD>threshold binary variable which equals 1 if LTD is
greater than threshold where LTD refers to
the amount of long-term debt maturing in the
following year that was issued before 2, 3, and
4 years ago, and threshold is one of the follow-
ing: 0% or 1% of total assets, or time-series
median of LTD within a firm (Almeida et al.,
2012)
Tenure Dummy years [3,5](years 6 and after) binary variables for the second (third) period
in CEO tenure where I break a CEO's en-
tire tenure length into three periods following
Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016): years [0,2],
years [3,5], and years 6 and after
GDP growth state-level annual growth rate of real GDP
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
ln(Population) the log of intercensal estimates of the resident
population for each states from the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau
Unemp state-level unemployment rate from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics
81
APPENDIX E
ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND TABLES
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Figure A1: Changes in Minimum Wage Laws Across the U.S. States and Corporate
Investment: Placebo Test
Coefficient on Actual Minimum Wage Increase
0
2
4
6
8
10
P
er
ce
nt
−.01 −.005 0 .005 .01
Coefficient on Psuedo Minimum Wage Increase
Changes in Minimum Wage Laws Across the U.S. States and Corporate Investment: Placebo Test
This figure is based on the following first difference regressions:
∆
Ii,s,t
Ki,s,t−1
= αt + β1∆Qi,s,t−1 + β2∆
CFi,s,t
Ki,s,t−1
+ βPseudo3 1
Pseudo
∆ws,t−1>0 + β4∆Xs,t−1 + ∆i,s,t
where Ii,s,t is investment, CFi,s,t refers to cash flow, Ki,s,t−1 is beginning-of-the-year capital, Qi,s,t−1
indicates Tobin’s q as a proxy for investment opportunities, αt is a set of year fixed effects, and Xs,t−1
is a set of state-level macro-variables: real GDP growth rates, log of population, and unemployment
rates. 1Pseudo∆ws,t−1>0 is a dummy variable indicating minimum wage increases at time t =1 in state s
where firm i’s hypothetical headquarters is located. I randomly assign a firm’s headquarters, and
repeat the estimation 1,000 times. The above figure is a density plot of βPseudo3 . The vertical red
line indicates the actual β3 obtained from the regression based on the actual data (Column (1) of
Panel B in Table 2). The green line shows kernel density. The sample period runs from 1994 to
2014 Q3. Standard errors are clustered by state.
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Table A2: Labor Adjustments and The Effects of Downward Wage Rigidity on
Corporate Investment
These tables present fixed effect OLS regressions of corporate investment on DWR and net hiring
rates (NHR) in Panel A and hiring (HR) and separation (SR) rates in Panel B. Net hiring rates,
HRi,t, are defined as Hi,t/[0.5 × (Ni,t−1 + Ni,t)] in which Ni,t is the number of employees and net
hiring, Hi,t, is the change in the number of employees from year t =1 to year t, Hi,t = Ni,t−Ni,t−1.
Hiring and separation rates are calculated from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators from the
U.S. Census Bureau. Details are described in Section C. The dependent variables in all columns
are Investment measured as capital expenditures normalized by the beginning-of-the-year capital
stock (property, plants, and equipment). I measure Cash Flow as earnings before extraordinary
items plus depreciation normalized by the beginning-of-the-year capital stock and Q as a ratio
of market value of assets to book value of assets. Column (3) uses firm-year observations
with positive DWR. I use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators from the U.S. Census Bureau
to construct DWR. Detailed definitions of the measure are reported in Section 2. The sample
period runs from 1994 to 2014 Q3. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedastic-
ity and clustered by firm. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Net Hiring Decisions
Dependent Variable: Corporate Investment
With Dummy Without Dummy
Full Sample Cond. on ∃ DR
(1) (2) (3)
1DWR>0 .0006
(.0023)
DWR -.2009∗∗∗ -.1947∗∗∗ -.2409∗∗∗
(.0607) (.0568) (.0640)
NHR .1784∗∗∗ .1784∗∗∗ .1764∗∗∗
(.0063) (.0063) (.0072)
Cash Flow .0314∗∗∗ .0314∗∗∗ .0367∗∗∗
(.0023) (.0023) (.0030)
Q .0700∗∗∗ .0700∗∗∗ .0682∗∗∗
(.0022) (.0022) (.0024)
Firm and Year FE Y Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 65,923 65,923 48,919
Adjusted R2 .2052 .2052 .2075
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Table A2: Labor Adjustments and The Effects of Downward Wage Rigidity on
Corporate Investment (continued)
Panel B. Hiring and Layoff Decisions
Dependent Variable: Corporate Investment
With Dummy Without Dummy
Full Sample Cond. on ∃ DR
(1) (2) (3)
1DWR>0 .0014
(.0023)
DWR -.1622∗∗∗ -.1476∗∗∗ -.1970∗∗∗
(.0547) (.0512) (.0585)
HR .3932∗∗∗ .3977∗∗∗ .4473∗∗∗
(.1276) (.1269) (.1588)
SR .1041 .1024 .2615∗
(.1128) (.1127) (.1411)
Cash Flow .0381∗∗∗ .0381∗∗∗ .0441∗∗∗
(.0023) (.0023) (.0030)
Q .0762∗∗∗ .0762∗∗∗ .0737∗∗∗
(.0022) (.0022) (.0025)
Firm and Year FE Y Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 69,661 69,661 51,060
Adjusted R2 .1721 .1721 .1770
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Table A3: Measurement Errors in Tobin’s q and Downward Wage Rigidity Measure:
Linear Cumulant Equations
This table presents the results of regressing corporate investment on DWR using the linear
high-order cumulant equations (Erickson, Jiang, and Whited, 2014) to address measurement errors
in Tobin’s q and DWR. I use the Quarterly Workforce Indicators from the U.S. Census Bureau
to construct DWR. Detailed definitions are reported in Section 2. The dependent variables in all
columns are Investment measured as capital expenditures normalized by the beginning-of-the-year
capital stock (property, plants, and equipment). I measure Cash Flow as earnings before extraordi-
nary items plus depreciation normalized by the beginning-of-the-year capital stock and Q as a ratio
of market value of assets to book value of assets. ρ2 is an estimate of the R2 of the regression, and
τ2DWR and τ
2
Q are indices of measurement quality for the two proxy variables, DWR and Q. Column
(1) reports the fixed effect OLS regression result in Column (2) of Panel A, Table 2. The sample
period runs from 1994 to 2014 Q3. In Column (1), standard errors in parentheses are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. In Column (2)-(4), bootstrapped standard errors that are
robust to within firm correlation are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Corporate Investment
OLS-FE EJW Higher-order Cumulant Estimator
4th Cum 5th Cum 6th Cum
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DWR -.1693∗∗∗ -.6473∗ -1.7391∗∗∗ -1.1983∗∗∗
(.0515) (.3514) (.4401) (.2272)
Cash Flow .0382∗∗∗ .0213∗∗∗ .0199∗∗∗ .0260∗∗∗
(.0023) (.0028) (.0027) (.0026)
Q .0764∗∗∗ .1814∗∗∗ .1923∗∗∗ .1535∗∗∗
(.0022) (.0080) (.0065) (.0071)
Firm and Year FE Y Y Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 69,661 69,661 69,661 69,661
Adjusted R2 .1713
ρ2 .2808 .2935 .2527
τ2DWR 0.1599 0.1243 0.1658
τ2Q 0.4736 0.4495 0.5413
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Table A4: Downward Wage Rigidity and Firm Value: Differential Effects Across
Over- and Underinvestment Using Alternative Measures
Panel A presents the results from a modified version of the valuation regression developed by
Fama and French (1998), a fixed effect OLS regression of Tobin’s q on downward wage rigidity for
underinvestment and overinvestment groups. I use residuals from investment regressions to identify
under(over)investment. Residuals are sorted into quintiles, hence Q1 proxies for underinvestment
whereas Q5 proxies for overinvestment. Column (1) and (2) are based on full sample, firm
and year fixed effects investment regression whereas Column (3) and (4) are based on rolling
window, firm and year fixed effects investment regression to avoid a look-ahead bias. Tobin’s
q is defined as a ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. I use the Quarterly
Workforce Indicators from the U.S. Census Bureau to construct DWR. Detailed definitions are
reported in Section 2. The control variables are: Earningst, ∆Earningst, ∆Earningst+1,
∆PP&Et, ∆PP&Et+1, ∆NAssetst, ∆NAssetst+1, RDt, ∆RDt, ∆RDt+1, Interestt, ∆Interestt,
∆Interestt+1, Dividendst, ∆Dividendst, ∆Dividendst+1, and ∆Qt+1 where Xt is the level of
variable X in year t normalized by total assets in year t. ∆Xt is the change in the level of X from
year t =1 to t normalized by total assets in year t, (Xt − Xt−1)/At, and ∆Xt+1 is the change in
the level of X from year t to t+1 normalized by total assets in year t, (Xt+1 −Xt)/At where A is
the book value of total assets. Detailed definitions of these control variables are reported in Section
D. [p− value] below H0: DWRQ5 - DWRQ1 = 0 is based on a one-tailed test. Standard errors in
parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by industry (SIC 2-digit).
Panel A. Residuals from Investment Regressions
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s q
Residuals from
Full Sample FE OLS Rolling FE OLS
Q1 Q5 Q1 Q5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DWR .8983 2.3830∗∗∗ -.4847 1.9333∗∗∗
(.9566) (.4753) (.8395) (.7216)
H0: DWRQ5 −DWRQ1 = 0 1.4847∗ 2.4180∗∗
[p-value] [0.0958] [0.0172]
Controls / Industry and Year FE Y Y Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 11,305 11,740 5,091 6,959
Adjusted R2 .2601 .2561 .2538 .2870
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Table A4: Downward Wage Rigidity and Firm Value: Differential Effects Across
Over- and Underinvestment Using Alternative Measures (continued)
Panel B uses a CEO tenure as a measure for overinvestment (Pan, Wang, and Weisbach, 2016).
Following Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016), I break a CEO's entire tenure length into three periods:
years [0,2], years [3,5], and years 6 and after. Tenure Dummy years [3,5](years 6 and after) is an
indicator variable for the second (third) period in CEO tenure. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by firm. The sample period runs from 1994 to 2014 Q3. ***, **, * indicate significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel B. CEO Investment Cycles (CEO Tenure)
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s q
Full Sample Firms with at least
9 years of observations
(1) (2)
DWR .3926 .1496
(.4439) (.4492)
DWR × Tenure Dummy years [3,5] .7121 .6918
(.6705) (.7513)
DWR × Tenure Dummy years 6 and after 1.3712∗∗ 1.5853∗∗
(.6367) (.6834)
Tenure Dummy years [3,5] -.0038 .0056
(.0139) (.0145)
Tenure Dummy years 6 and after .0233 .0247
(.0167) (.0170)
Controls / Firm and Year FE Y Y
# of Firm-Year Obs. 22,559 20,142
Adjusted R2 .3000 .3087
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